Investor Behaviour Facing Risk : Neurofinance and Financial Crises by Baechler, Guillaume
AVERTISSEMENT 
 
 
Ce document est le fruit d’un long travail approuvé par le jury de 
soutenance et mis à disposition de l’ensemble de la 
communauté universitaire élargie. 
 
Il est soumis à la propriété intellectuelle de l’auteur : ceci 
implique une obligation de citation et de référencement lors de 
l’utilisation de ce document. 
 
D’autre part, toute contrefaçon, plagiat, reproduction illicite de 
ce travail expose à des poursuites pénales. 
 
Contact : portail-publi@ut-capitole.fr 
 
 
 
 
 
LIENS 
 
 
Code la Propriété Intellectuelle – Articles L. 122-4 et L. 335-1 à 
L. 335-10 
Loi n°92-597 du 1er juillet 1992, publiée au Journal Officiel du 2 
juillet 1992 
http://www.cfcopies.com/V2/leg/leg-droi.php 
http://www.culture.gouv.fr/culture/infos-pratiques/droits/protection.htm 
 
 
 
 
 
THÈSE 
En vue de l’obtention du 
 
DOCTORAT DE L’UNIVERSITE DE TOULOUSE 
 
Délivré par l’Université Toulouse Capitole 
 
École doctorale : Sciences de Gestion 
 
 
Présentée et soutenue publiquement par 
 
Guillaume BAECHLER 
 
le 8 septembre 2016 
 
Investor Behaviour Facing Risk: Neurofinance and 
Financial Crises 
 
 
Discipline : Sciences de Gestion 
Spécialité : Finance 
Unité de recherche : TBS Research Centre 
Directeur de thèse : Laurent GERMAIN 
 
 
 
JURY 
 
 
 
Rapporteurs Mr Pramuan BUNKANWANICHA, Professeur, ESCP Europe 
 Mr Gilles CHEMLA, Professeur des Universités, Université Paris  
Dauphine 
 
Suffragante Mme Catherine CASAMATTA, Professeur des Universités, Université 
Toulouse 1 Capitole 
 
 
1 
  
 
Acknowledgements 
 
Firstly, I would like to thank many people for helping me and encouraging me through the 
few years’ passes on my thesis. I am very honoured for those who supported me continuously 
one way and another to achieve my thesis. 
 
I am especially grateful to Professor Laurent Germain who guided me and bring me 
invaluable assistance during my research. I want to thank him warmly for bringing me his 
support and for allowing me to communicate his enthusiasm and have especially been patient 
with me. 
 
I am deeply thankful to Professors Catherine Casamatta, Pramuan Bunkanwanicha and Gilles 
Chemla for doing me the honour of sitting on my thesis committee. 
 
I am grateful to Professor Nicolas Nalpas for providing me an incredible support and a very 
precious assistance. I would like also to thank Professor Jean-Francois Verdier, who has made 
my thesis easier putting myself at disposal of all the required material, thanks a lot for all the 
logistic. 
 
I am also delighted to thank Professor Sébastien Pouget for doing the honour of sitting my 
sitting committee, our brainstorming was very constructive and precious to guide me during 
my thesis. 
 
I am also very grateful of the support of Professor Frederic Dehais who assisted me during my 
experiment; I really appreciated his commitment and support during this exercise. 
 
 
2 
 
I am grateful to Professor Pavy-Le Traon, for her analytical mind and patience made me 
profoundly advanced in my research work.  
 
I also want to thank the doctoral staff Laura Campbell & Alexandre Maini for your 
unwavering support and your kindness to me. 
 
I met a lot of friends also during my thesis and I would like to thank my fellow Taieb, 
Clément, Chachou and Marie-Anne, thanks a lot for their kindness and support. 
 
A special thank you to all my friends who supported me through the past few years, thanks to 
Audrey, Charles, Kheira, Lionel, Coline, Julien, Benjamin, Louis, Laetitia, Mathilde and all 
the others ones who provided me their friendship and kindness. 
 
I am very thankful to Géraldine who provided me an incredible support and assistance during 
my thesis, thanks for her patience and kindness. 
 
I am also grateful to my beloved grandmothers Jeanne and Arlette, my grandfather Robert, 
my godfather Michel and godmother Marcelle and my aunt Bernadette for their kindness and 
support. 
 
I am more grateful than I could say to my parents Marie-Anne and Paul for their support, and 
I could not thank them enough for being who they are.  Thank you so much for being such 
comprehensive and kind parents. 
  
 
 
3 
Résumé 
 
 
Cette thèse étudie le comportement des investisseurs au travers de leur performance et de 
leurs attentes durant les crises financières de 2008-2011 et de leurs croyances. Elle se 
compose de trois chapitres. 
 
Dans le premier chapitre, nous faisons une revue de la littérature existante sur la performance 
des investisseurs individuels, leur biais comportementaux et leurs préférences. Nous montrons 
les principales lacunes en terme de performance des investisseurs individuels ainsi que leurs 
principaux biais comportementaux. Nous mettons également en lumière l’apport des 
neurosciences dans la compréhension du comportement des investisseurs individuels. 
 
Dans le deuxième chapitre, nous étudions l’impact des crises financières de 2008-2011 sur la 
performance des investisseurs individuels et leurs attentes à l’égard de leurs intermédiaires 
financiers dans quatre différents pays : Allemagne, Belgique, Luxembourg, France. Nous 
établissons également une comparaison en fonction du niveau de richesse des investisseurs à 
l’intérieur de chaque pays mais aussi globalement. Nos données proviennent de 
questionnaires distribués à des gestionnaires d’actifs dans les plus grandes banques des pays 
pris en considération ainsi que des données de marché historiques pour chacun de ces pays. 
Nous montrons que les investisseurs les plus fortunés sont les moins réfractaires à la prise de 
risque que ce soit avant ou après les crises financières, quel que soit le pays pris en 
considération. Nous remarquons aussi que ces derniers adoptent les stratégies 
d’investissement les moins conservatrices. Enfin nous notons un important changement des 
attentes des investisseurs par rapport à leurs intermédiaires financiers, demandant plus de 
transparence et un meilleur service clientèle, quel que soit le niveau de richesse. Nous 
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montrons enfin que ces attentes peuvent être contradictoires notamment chez les investisseurs 
les moins fortunés. 
 
Dans le troisième chapitre, nous fournissons un test expérimental sur la formation des 
croyances chez les investisseurs individuels d’après le modèle de Brunnermeier et Parker 
(2005). Nous utilisons à cet effet une expérimentation avec deux loteries identiques excepté 
leur skewness. Nous montrons que les participants à cette expérimentation ressentent des 
émotions par anticipation une fois qu’ils ont pris connaissance de la loterie à laquelle ils vont 
jouer. Ces émotions se forment à partir de la deuxième minute d’attente et restent stables 
jusqu’à ce qu’ils prennent connaissance de leurs gains. Par ailleurs, ces émotions par 
anticipation sont aussi fortes que celles ressenties une fois leurs gains connus. Enfin nous 
montrons que les sujets participants à la loterie avec une skewness positive présente moins de 
capacité d’auto régulation que les autres sujets. Les émotions qu’ils ressentent sont plus fortes 
et plus persistantes que chez les autres. 
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Abstract 
 
 
 
This thesis studies the investors behaviour through their performance and their expectations 
during the 2008-2011 financial crises as well as their beliefs formation. It consists of three 
chapters. 
 
In the first chapter, we review the literature on individual investors performance, their 
behavioural biases and their preferences. We highlight their lack of performance on financial 
markets and their main behavioural biases. We also exhibit the contribution of neurosciences 
in the understanding of the investor’s brain. 
 
In the second chapter, we study the impacts of the 2008-2011 financial crises on individual 
investors returns and their expectations towards their financial intermediaries in four different 
countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg. We also consider investors differences 
regarding their endowment, inside each country and globally. Our dataset is extracted from 
questionnaires administered to asset managers in the main banks in the countries considered 
as well as historical market data for each country. We show that wealthier investors are less 
risk averse and their level of risk aversion has not changed with financial crises whatever the 
country considered. Furthermore, these wealthier investors adopt less conservative investment 
strategies than retail ones. We notice an important shift regarding the investors’ expectations 
towards their financial intermediaries, since the crises they ask for more transparency and 
more client services. We also show that these expectations may be contradictory a bit in retail 
investors. 
 
 
 
6 
In the third chapter, we provide an experimental test of investors beliefs formations according 
to Brunnermeier and Parker model (2005). For this purpose, we use a two identical lotteries 
design except in terms of skewness. We show that participants to this experiment feel 
anticipatory emotions once they have learned the lottery they will play. These emotions are 
formed from the second waiting minute and remain stable until they learn their gains. Besides, 
anticipatory emotions are as strong as emotions felt once the payoffs known. Finally, we 
demonstrate that subjects participating in the positively skewed lottery exhibit less self-
regulation than other subjects. Hence, their emotions are stronger and more persistent. 
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General introduction 
 
 
 
1. Why are individual investors so naïve? 
 
Over the past decades, financial news has given many examples of injured individual 
investors by their investment decisions, especially during the 2008 financial crisis. None 
investors seem to be saved from investment mistakes, wealthy individuals, celebrities, banks, 
funds and small savers. 
 
In this regards, the Madoff scandal offers a particularly good case study. For many years, 
individuals’ investors as well as professional ones trusted Bernard Madoff and his above the 
average returns without asking themselves any questions with very few exceptions like the 
report submitted by Harry Markopolos to SEC, dated November 7, 2015 “The World’s 
Largest Hedge Fund is a Fraud”. When financial markets dropped in September 2008, several 
investors wanted to withdraw their investments, causing the fall of the system. Many kind of 
investors have lost money in the scandal from the wealthiest to the smallest. Some have even 
lost all their savings. 
 
This scandal leads a question: why are investors so naïve while financial history is plenty of 
such scandals.   
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Academic research widely investigates individual investors performance in financial markets, 
biases, expectations, preferences and under diversification, leading to the fact that individual 
investor suffers from several biases at his expense. 
 
 
2. Thesis organization 
 
The aim of this three-essays thesis is to investigate a particular aspect of the individual 
investors: how does he faces risk? This thesis is organized as follows  
 
In the first chapter we draw a survey of the existing literature on investor behaviour. We first 
present his general performance on financial markets with cross countries and cross sectional 
differences. Then, we focus on the main behavioural biases he has to deal with, causing his 
poor performance on financial markets. We also look at his preferences in terms of risk and 
time and beliefs. Afterwards, we examine the new insight on investor’s brain that 
neurosciences offer. 
 
In the second chapter, we investigate the impacts of the 2008-2011 financial crises on 
individual investors across four countries (Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg) and 
two types of individual investors (high net worth and retail investors) with questionnaires 
submitted to asset managers and historical data on asset allocation. We show that wealthier 
investors are less risk averse than others, whatever the country considered. We also notice that 
wealthier investors adopt less conservative strategies. We exhibit the new expectations 
investors have towards their financial intermediaries.  
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In the third chapter we investigate the individual investors beliefs formation through the 
model of Brunnermeier and Parker (2005). We provide a two lotteries design with equal 
lotteries except for skewness. We show that investors form anticipatory emotions once they 
know the lottery they play from the second minute of the waiting interval until they learn their 
payoffs. Furthermore, this anticipatory emotion is as strong as the emotion felt when 
receiving the earnings. Finally, we show that subjects playing the skewed lottery exhibit less 
self-regulation than others. Their emotions are more robust and more persistent. 
 
 
3. Contribution 
 
The different chapters of this thesis contribute differently to the academic research on 
investor’s behaviour. 
 
Far be it from us to pretend that our literature review may be considered as approaching the 
quality of the ones from Barberis and Thaler (2003) in Behavioural Finance or Sébastien 
Pouget (2000) in Experimental Finance. Nevertheless, we provide a corpus which try to 
gather all methods used in Finance (theoretical, empirical, experimental and neurological) in 
the aim of explaining the investors’ behaviour across countries and across investors’ 
characteristics. 
 
In the second chapter we conduct a survey based study across four countries (Belgium, 
France, Germany and Luxembourg) and across two different types of individual investors 
(high net worth and retail investors). We analyse our questionnaires in two ways: qualitatively 
and quantitatively and compare the results with historical data in the same countries from 
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2008 to 1012. We show that wealthier investors are less risk averse than others before and 
after the crises, whatever the country considered. We also show that wealthier investors adopt 
less conservative investing strategies. Then, we exhibit changes in investors’ expectations 
regarding their financial intermediaries. They wish more transparency and more client 
services whatever the type of investors considered. 
 
In the third chapter, we provide a physiological test on the model of Brunnermeier and Parker 
(2005) with a two equivalent lotteries experiment except in terms of skewness. We show that 
participants experience anticipatory emotions regarding their future outcomes from the second 
minute of the waiting period once they know the lottery they play. This anticipatory emotion 
is a s strong as the emotion felt once they learn their earnings. Finally, we highlight that 
subjects taking part in the skewed lottery exhibit less self-regulation than others. Their 
emotions are stronger and more persistent. 
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Chapter 1: Literature Review on Investor 
Behaviour 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Following various scandals in financial markets over the last decades – the Madoff scandal 
being one of the famous regarding individual investors –  evidence is acquired that individual 
investors suffer from several issues regarding their investment strategies. 
 
The Madoff scandal is symptomatic of the lack of financial knowledge, naïve diversification 
and over-optimism of individual investors. Furthermore, the scandal affected wealthy 
investors as well as small savers all around the world. Another famous example, but less 
global was the Euro tunnel scandal. British government required private financing only. 
Hence, French and British governments called out private investors to purchase Euro tunnel 
stocks. Around 80% of purchasers were French small savers who found a good opportunity to 
save money for their retirement plan. Indeed, they were promised good and safe returns. 
Unfortunately, construction was delayed and the stock value of Euro tunnel dropped. Many 
investors lost most of their savings and the scandal made headlines in French newspapers and 
newscast late in the 80’s. 
 
One may ask himself how can individual investors remain so naïve about their asset 
allocation, when plenty of such examples exist through financial history?  
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The aim of this literature review is to address the following questions: 
• How does individual investor perform on financial markets? 
• What are the main drivers of this performance? 
• How new fields in Science, especially neurosciences can help understanding 
individual investors behaviour? 
 
 
2. Individual investor returns 
2.1. Long-term returns 
 
Barber and Odean (2000) analyse trading activity from 78,000 households in the US from 
1991 to 1997 from the same discount brokerage firm. This dataset is innovative because it 
contains demographic data as well as positions and trading records. They show that, in their 
sample, households who managed their own portfolios earned gross returns on average 18.7% 
compared with the mean gross of an averaged value-weighted market (17.9%). However, 
when taking into account the net performance (after transaction costs and bid/ask spread), the 
average household earning was 16.7%, subpar the value-weighted market. In addition, the 
authors explain that investors who trade most actively earn less. They divide their sample into 
quintiles and show that the 20% of investors who trade most earn annually about 10% (net 
value) and the 20% of investors who trade least earn about 20%. 
 
This pattern is not specific to the US case. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) investigate the 
behaviour of foreign and domestic investors in the Finland market with a 2-years trading 
dataset. The authors calculate the investors performance on day t by the difference between 
the buy ratio of four stocks that future performance are in the top quartile minus the buy ratio 
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of the four stocks with future performance (from t+1 to t+120) in the lowest quartile. If the 
difference is positive, the buy ratio of future winning stocks is over the buy ratio of future 
losing stocks and thus the investor is a better performer. They find that the buy ratio for 
households is positive only 45% of the time. On the other hand, foreign investors and local 
financial companies have a positive ratio more than 55% of days. Thus, individual investors 
are buyers of weak performance stocks. 
 
Barber et al. (2009) observe a similar pattern in Taiwan from 1995 to 1999. Their dataset all 
them to compare all investors. They find that the aggregate portfolio of individual investors 
underperforms annually by 3.8%. The overall losses made by individual investors represent 
2.2% of the Taiwan’s GDP. In the same time the aggregate portfolio of institutional investors 
over perform by 1.5%. 
 
 Odean (1999) finds consistent results with individual records in the US, highlighting the poor 
performance of individual investors before trading costs. He uses trading records of individual 
investors from a large discount brokerage firm between 1987 and 1993. His finds that the 
stocks bought by individual investors underperform the stocks sold in the year after the 
transaction. 
 
 
2.2. Short-term returns 
 
Regarding short term returns outside the US (1 week or less), Barber et al. (2009) report that 
individual investors suffer from losses on both their short term and long term trades. They 
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construct a portfolio that mimic daily net purchases. They find negative earnings with 
monthly alphas of -10.97%, -3.27%, -1.91% for respectively 1 day, 10 days and 25 days. 
 
Andrade et al. (2008) find the same results in Taiwan too with data from 1994 to 2002. Stocks 
bought heavily by individual investors perform poorly the following week, while those sold 
perform well. 
 
 In the US, individual investors appear to perform better. Using NYSE data between 2000 and 
2003, Kaniel et al. (2008) demonstrate that the first decile of stocks heavily bought by 
individual investors has returns of 16 basis points over the next 20 trading days. With the 
same dataset they show (2011) that the aggregate stocks bought the 10 days before an 
earnings announcement over perform those sold in the 2 days around the announcement. 
 
 
2.3. Order types 
 
Research is mixed about individual investors profits and market order types. The Taiwan 
Stock Exchange functions only with limit orders. Barber et al. (2009) categorize with their 
data trades as passive or aggressive. Aggressive trades are those with prices higher than the 
most recent unfilled limit order. Buy and sell orders are categorized in the same way. 
Individual investors loose on their aggressive trades on short and long term. However, they 
make profits from their passive trades at short horizons in the range of 1 to 10 days following. 
 
Using data from the Finnish Stock Exchange, Linnainmaa (2010) finds that individual 
investors lose money on their trades regarding their limit orders they use vastly (about 75%). 
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This reason is not that other investors take advantage from their limit orders. He shows that 
individual investors limit orders decrease by more than 3% in the following 63 days. 
However, their market orders increase by more than 3.5% in the same time interval. 
 
 
3. Factors influencing investor returns  
3.1. Investors capacities 
 
Grinblatt et al. (2012) investigate the relation between IQ and the stock selection made by 
individual investors in Finland between 1995 and 2002. To measure IQ, they use the Finnish 
Armed Force Intelligence Assessment (FAF) distributed to males around age 20 to detect best 
candidates for mandatory military training. The test contains 120 questions divided in three 
domains: mathematical knowledge, verbal skills, logical skills. The global score for the test 
ranges from 1 to 9 (most intelligent). The authors define low IQ investors, investors with FAF 
score between 1 and 4 and high IQ those with FAF score of 9. Hence, 24% of their sample is 
low IQ while 8% is high IQ. They find that high IQ investors make better trades than low IQ 
with a better trade execution. 
 
Other research comfort these results with inside the US. Korniotis and Kumar (2009a) 
demonstrate, using brokerage records from 1991 to 1996 that investors with higher cognitive 
abilities over perform the others by more than 3%. They also find that individual investors 
performance decreases with age. 
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Van Rooij et al. (2011) investigate the link between financial literacy and performance on 
financial markets in Netherlands. They exhibit that investors with higher level of financial 
literacy are more likely to participate in financial markets and make more profits. 
 
Regarding 401(k) plans domain, Agnew and Szykman (2005) test whereas the investor’s 
financial knowledge might influence his choices regarding saving plans. They conduct two 
experiments to test the information overload leading to adopt a default “saving plan”. They 
compare the number of investment choices offered, the similarity of choices and the way 
choices are displayed, controlling for the financial knowledge of participants. Their results 
demonstrate that investors with a low level of financial capabilities invest more in the default 
plan (about 20%) than investors with high capabilities (2%). This behaviour is defined by 
Choi et al. (2002) as “the path of least resistance”. 
 
 
3.2. Gender differences 
 
In a paper investigating the gender overconfidence between men and women from 1991 to 
1997, Barber and Odean (2001) find that men are more prone to overconfidence. Indeed, they 
trade 45% more than women. Even if both ear poor returns, men perform worse because of 
their excessive trading activity and the resulting trading costs. 
 
Cervellati et al. (2011) find similar results in Italy with a data sample from a small 
cooperative bank between 2005 and 2007. They measure effects on age, gender as well as job 
position and incomes from online traders. They find no evidence about the effects of age on 
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trading behaviour but show that the number of trades increases when clients are men, self-
employed, retired, or online traders. 
  
 
 
22 
3.3. Day trading 
 
Barber et al. (2013) investigate the performance of day traders from 1992 to 2006. They 
choose a country where day trading is a common habit: Taiwan. Day traders represent about 
17% of all trading volume exchanged in the Taiwan Stock Exchange and are over 300,000. 
The author rank day traders regarding their returns in a year y and measure their performance 
in year y+1. Only the 1% of day traders (about 4,000) the most profitable the prior year earn 
positive returns net of transaction costs the following year. The top 500 day traders earn gross 
returns of 61 basis points on their day trading portfolio compared with the thousands of 
traders with intraday returns of -11.5 bps per day. This research show that day traders 
outperform other traders that trade less frequently. This suggest a kind of performance 
persistence over time. Coval et al. (2005) show persistence in the performance of individual 
investors. They classify investors in deciles according to their performance during the first 
half of their sample and compare it with performance of the same investors during the second 
half of their sample. The earning spread between the top and the bottom decile is around 5 
basis point per day. Per year, investors in the top decile beat investors in the bottom decile by 
8% per year. 
 
 
4. Behavioural biases as an explanation of bad individual investor 
performance 
 
In the previous section we show that individual investors have poor performance in average 
and that performance is dependent of cross sectional aspects such age, gender or skills. The 
underperformance of individual investors is even worst when taking into account trading 
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costs. One of the reasons is the bad security selection made by investors (Agnew & Szykman 
2005). In the following section we investigate the main biases leading to these bad investment 
performances. 
 
 
4.1. Overconfidence 
 
Overconfidence is one of the most behavioural biases studied in Finance. Literature on the 
topic is numerous with many literature reviews already existing (Moore and Healy 2008). 
Overconfidence can take many aspects such as miscalibration, better-than-average effect and 
self-attribution bias. 
 
 
4.1.1. Miscalibration 
 
Miscalibration is defined as the tendency that have individuals to overestimate the precision 
of their information. This bias is often measured through answers to difficult questions, one is 
asked to provide confidence intervals to these questions such that the correct answer lies in 
this interval with a 90% probability. People well calibrated usually provide intervals 
containing the correct answer more than 90% of the time.  
 
Most theoretical papers based on overconfidence such as Daniel et al. (1998) or Gervais and 
Odean (2001), use miscalibration. Extension from Kyle (1985) or Grossman and Stiglitz 
(1980) assume that investors are prone to miscalibration, overestimating the precision of their 
private signals. This behaviour leads those investors to trade too much. 
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Biais et al. (2005) make an experimental test of miscalibration following Plott and Sunder 
(1988) experimental market with pre experiment questionnaires to value participants 
miscalibration. However, they add short sales possibility and a call auction in addition to 
continuous auction. In their setup one single risky asset is traded and this asset pays a 
liquidating dividend of 490, 240 or 50 francs with equal probability at the end of the game. 
Before the experiment starts, each participant receives a private and imperfect signal about the 
asset’s dividend. For instance, when the final value is 50 francs, half players knows that the 
dividend will not be 490 francs and the other half knows that the dividend will not be 290 
francs. If traders are miscalibrated they will overestimate their private information about the 
final dividend. The authors find a clear negative correlation between miscalibration and 
trading profits make by participants. The average return of the 25% least miscalibrated traders 
was about 131.36 and the average return of 25% most miscalibrated was about -147.67. 
 
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009) study overconfidence as well and sensation seeking in the 
Finnish stock market. They show that overconfident investors tend to trade more than others. 
 
 
4.1.2. Better-than-average effect 
 
The second type of overconfidence is the tendency one may have to believe himself better 
than a median individual. Glaser and Weber (2007) test several behavioural biases such as 
miscalibration, better-than-average, unrealistic optimism and illusion of control of 215 
German investors who responded to a questionnaire. They find no evidence of the effect of 
miscalibration on trading volume. However, investors who think themselves better-than-
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average regarding their investment abilities and past performance in financial markets trade 
more. 
 
 
 
4.1.3. Self-attribution 
 
The self-attribution bias is defined as the tendency investors have to attribute their successes 
to their own competence and their failures to bad luck. Barber and Odean (2002) investigate 
the behaviour of more than 1,600 investors who have switched from phone to online trading 
between 1991 and 1996. They find that investors who switched to online trading performed 
better before switching, beating the market by 2% annually on average. But, after trading 
online, they start trading more and make less profits, performing under the market by 3% 
annually. The authors explain this drop in performance by self-attribution and 
overconfidence. 
 
 
4.2. Gambling motivation 
 
Kumar (2009) analyse data from a US discount brokerage between 1991 and 1996 to find 
whereas sociological and psychological factors that are known to encourage lottery purchases 
influence investments in lottery type assets. They show that people investing more in lottery 
type assets have a lower mean performance. They also find that some sociological factors that 
impact lottery purchases have the same influence on lottery type assets purchasing. Indeed, 
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investors poor, young, living downtown, tending to vote Republican, belonging to specific 
minorities, invest more in lottery type assets. 
 
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2009) test sensation seeking (gambling motivation) and 
overconfidence as factors leading to excessive trading activity in Finland. They measure 
overconfidence with data from a questionnaire administered to enter the Finnish Army which 
measures respondents’ true and perceived abilities. They use traffic tickets as a proxy for 
gambling motivation making the assumption that investors speeding are sensation seekers. 
Overall, gambling motivations and overconfidence lead investors to trade more. 
Dorn and Sengmueller (2009) find similar results using trading and survey data from 1,000 
German investors. Investors who claim themselves as “enjoying investing” or gambling turn 
over their portfolios 100% more than other investors. The authors highlight that the gambling 
motivation itself explain the investors’ excess trading and balance the decrease in 
performance. 
 
 
4.3. Familiarity and local biases 
 
The effects of the local bias about investors’ behaviour is unclear. Some research show that 
they have an informational advantage when investing in companies close to them or in 
companies in the same industry as they are employed in and this informational advantage 
leads to higher returns. Other research argue that individuals overinvest in companies they are 
familiar with, leading to under diversification and lower returns. 
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Massa and Simonov (2006) study familiarity as an information driver on Swedish investors. 
They show that investors invest more in stocks closely related to them either geographically 
or professionally. They argue that this familiarity investment strategy allows investors to earn 
higher returns. Ivkovic and Weisbenner (2005) demonstrate the same advantage of investing 
in closely related firms. In their sample from 1991 to 1996, households earned superior 
returns of more than 3% on their local stocks compared with their foreign stocks. However, 
using the same dataset, Seasholes and Zhu (2010) find contrary results and show that 
individual investors investing in local stocks do not earn abnormal excess return. 
 
 
4.4. Mood 
Some factors like weather have an impact on peoples’ mood. Hirshleifer and Shumway 
(2003) find evidence that sunny weather influence trading activity. They use daily market 
returns data from 26 countries between 1982 and 1997. The authors find that sunshine is 
strongly correlated  
with daily stock returns but find no relation between stock returns and other weather 
conditions such snowing or raining. This weather strategy implies very frequent trading, thus 
only investors with low transaction costs can take benefit from such strategy. 
 
Edmans et al. (2007) investigate market reactions induced by investors’ changes in mood. 
They use soccer, cricket, rugby and baseball outcomes as proxies of investors’ mood. They 
find a strong correlation between bad sports outcomes and market decline. A loss in the 
World Cup elimination stage leads to an abnormal stock return of -49 basis points the next 
trading day. This effect is stronger in small markets and with the most popular games. 
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4.5. Disposition effect 
 
The disposition effect is known as the propensity individual investors have to hold stocks that 
has decreased in value and sell stocks that has increased in value relative to their purchase 
price (Shefrin & Statman, 1985).  
 
Several papers have confirmed the presence of the disposition effect. Weber and Camerer 
(1998) conduct an experiment to test the disposition effect. In their study, participants make 
portfolio decisions with six risky assets before 14 periods. Probabilities of increase vary 
across stocks but not across rounds. Subjects know the probability distribution but not which 
stock will increase (or decrease) the most. They find that that 60% of sales are are winners 
sales while 40% of sales are losers sales. 
 
Odean (1998) uses 10,000 trading records from an US discount brokerage between 1987 and 
1993 to compare the investors rate of selling winners (realized gains) and losers (realized 
losses) with the opportunities to sell winners and losers. He demonstrates that the rate of 
realized gains is 50% higher than the rate of realized loses. 
 
Feng and Seasholes (2005) find that individual investors in China learn to avoid the 
disposition effect.  Investor sophistication and experience (time since the first trade) reduce 
the disposition effect by 37%, but fails to eliminate it. 
 
Barberis and Xiong (2009) have modelled the trading behaviour of investors with prospect 
theories preferences. Their findings suggest that when investors’ performances are evaluated 
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on an annual basis, the prospect theory preferences do not lead to disposition effect. Indeed, 
investors seem to realize more losses than gains. 
 
Summers and Duxbury (2007) experimentally investigate the involvement of emotions in the 
disposition effect with two experiment. During the first experiment, participants are endowed 
an asset they have not chosen in period 1. Then are informed of the current value of the asset 
and the historic of price movements of this asset during the previous period. Asset value in 
period 1 is then revealed to subjects. Hence, they are not responsible of the gains or losses 
they experienced in this period. Next, they are allowed to trade the asset and the final price is 
revealed in period 2.  In the second experiment half subjects are passive investors endowed 
with a fictive company stock. The others are endowed with an equivalent amount of cash and 
need to actively choose to hold stocks contrary to experiment 1. The authors show that the 
disposition effect do not exist when participants do not actively choose the assets in their 
portfolios. If they do not feel themselves responsible for the investment decisions conducting 
to gains or losses, they are not more prone to sell winners more than losers. Therefore, 
emotional regret and pride lead to the disposition effect. 
 
Weber and Welfens (2011) experimentally analyse the purchase-repurchasing behaviour 
linked with regrets. They specifically investigate the investors preference for purchasing 
additional shares of a stock that has declined previously and the tendency to repurchase stocks 
they have previously sold at a higher price. They find that participants are more likely to 
purchase stocks if the price of the stock decline following a purchase in the previous period 
only when they are responsible of the original sale, subjects refrain from repurchasing stocks 
at a higher price than their prior sale price to avoid admitting wrong decision and regret. 
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Strahilevitz et al. (2004) find similar results about emotional regret with empirical data about 
household between 1991 and 1999. They show that households are more likely to repurchase 
stocks they have previously sold if the price dropped since the previous transaction. 
 
 
4.6. Path dependence 
 
The simplest definition of learning is to repeat actions that procured pleasure and avoid 
actions that procure pain or disappointment. Several studies demonstrate that investors are 
particularly sensitive to past successes. Learning reinforcement is also defined as path-
dependence. 
Choi et al. (1009) document this learning intensification pattern with a dataset from 1998 to 
2000. They show that individual investors extrapolate too much regarding their savings 
decisions. Those who experienced previous greater outcomes or lower variance in their 
401(k) plans tend to invest more in these plans than investors who have experienced less 
pleasuring experiences.  
 
Strahilevitz et al. (2004) show that investors are more likely to repurchase an asset they have 
previously sold for a profit rather than an asset they previously sold for a loss. 
 
De et al. (2010) show that investors are more sensitive to the intensity than to the magnitude 
of a stimulus. They demonstrate that investors trade more actively when their past recent 
trades were successful and the influence of the success or failure is stronger than the amount 
gained or lost. Overall trading according to past success leads to a decrease in investors’ 
profits. 
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4.7. Limited attention 
 
Investors limited attention has two effects. On one side dedicating too little attention to 
information may result in delayed reaction to this information. On the other side, dedicating 
too much attention to information can lead to overreaction. 
 
Barber and Odean (2008) find that attention influences investors purchase decisions. Indeed, 
they face searching problems when looking for stocks to buy. They do not systematically 
search. Many investors consider stocks that grab their attention in news or in terms or price 
movements. 
Hirshleifer et al. (2008) demonstrate that market reactions to earnings surprises are smaller for 
companies announcing earning the same days where other firms announce theirs and post-
earnings drifts are bigger similarly, because many companies compete to grab investors’ 
attention in this pattern. 
 
Seasholes and Wu (2007) examine attention buying side in the Shanghai stock market. They 
show that stocks that hit upper price limits grab attention of individual investors. Even 
individuals who have never owned a stock before are sensitive to this attention grabbing 
event. The upper price limit event coincides with an initial price increase and a mean 
reversion the following week. Hence, rational traders profit from this attention-based buying.  
 
Several papers investigate the relationship between media and investors’ attention. Engelberg 
et al. (2012) study overnight market reactions following Mad Money’s recommendations. 
They find that market reactions are immediate after the recommendations. The abnormal 
overnight return is over 3% on their sample and the price movements are higher for wealthy 
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investors who watch the shows than for low income households. Moreover, the overnight 
return of the first buy recommendation is greater than the first time sell recommendation. 
 
Engelberg and Parsons (2011) study the impact of events reported in newspapers on trading 
activity. They find that investors are more likely to trade an S&P 500 stock after an earnings 
announcement if this announcement was covered by local newspapers. 
 
 
4.8. Affect based trading 
 
Cooper et al. (2001) investigate stock price movements in reaction to the announcement of a 
company which changes its name into a dotcom name in the US. Between 1998 and 1999. 
They find a strong increase in stock prices with cumulative abnormal returns about 74% prior 
and after the changing name announcement. They also find that the premium investors apply 
to changing names companies does not depend on their level of involvement in the sector. 
 
In another study, Frieder and Subrahmanyam (2005) test the effect of brand perception on 
investors and their willingness to hold stocks of firms with high brand recognition. They find 
strong correlation between brand visibility and stock holding of this firm. The authors argue 
that individual investors prefer investing in companies in which they think they have more 
information as it is more visible. 
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4.9. Naïve and insufficient diversification 
 
Many papers prove evidence that individual investors do not hold diversified portfolios and 
therefore do not behave like risk averse investors, minimizing their idiosyncratic risk. Those 
who invest in stocks of their own company or the company they work in are particularly 
exposed, like Enron employees. Poterba (2003) study the 20 largest contribution plans 
managed by companies and find that over 45% of these plans are invested in company stocks. 
 
Bernartzi and Thaler (2001) demonstrate naïve diversification with 1/n heuristic. In one of 
their survey based experiments they ask participants to allocate their wealth between two 
funds (A and B) with three conditions. In the first condition, fund A is invested in stocks and 
fund B in bonds. In the second condition, fund A is still invested in stocks and fund B is a 
balanced fund with half stocks and half bonds. In the last condition, fund A is the balanced 
fund and fund B is the bond fund. The authors find that the final asset allocation chosen by 
participants mostly depends on the funds offered. Subjects use naïve diversification with 1/n 
heuristic, they divide their money over the alternatives offered. When more stock funds are 
presented to them, they increase their allocation in equities. When more bond funds are 
presented the same happens with their fixed income allocation. 
 
Huberman and Jiang (2006) test the robustness of this finding with 500,000 records about 
401(k) plans data. They do not find the same influence of funds offered over investment 
decisions. They show that household tend to allocate their wealth uniformly across the funds 
they use. On average they used between 3 and 4 funds and this is not sensitive to the number 
of funds that may be offered. Finally, they argue that the inclination an investor has to allocate 
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his contribution to equity funds is not sensitive to the ratio of equity funds proposed over all 
funds. 
 
On average individual investors hold very few stocks. According to Barber and Odean (2000) 
individual investors only hold about four stocks. Goetzmann and Kumar (2008) show that 
individual investors on average hold under-diversified portfolios. The level of under-
diversification greatly depends on the age, the income, the education level and the level of 
sophistication. Hence, Under-diversification is greater amongst younger, low income, 
uneducated, and less sophisticated investors. Furthermore, they document that under-
diversification is correlated with over-weighting stocks with high volatility and high 
skewness. These results are in line with Grinblatt et al. (2011) who show that Finnish 
investors with higher IQ hold a larger number of stocks and mutual funds. 
 
Campbell (2006) portrays the household investment behaviour. He shows that many 
households solve the complex investment problem adequately. However, some households, 
typically poorer and less educated ones, make investment mistakes such as under-
diversification amongst others. He documents that about 50% of the volatility in retail 
portfolios is due to a lack of diversification. 
 
The home bias is a strong phenomenon, investors prefer familiar and local companies and 
stocks though this trend is decreasing. French (2008) reports that the average U.S. investor 
portfolio allocated to foreign stocks grow from 2% in 1980 to 8.5% in 1990 and more than 
27% in 2007. Huberman (2001) study the geographic bias through regional phone companies. 
He shows that investors prefer investing in a local rather than a distant phone company. 
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5. Investor preferences 
5.1. Optimistic beliefs and the preference for skewed returns 
 
Several papers have investigated optimistic beliefs among individual investors. One of the 
most popular models is the Optimal Expectations framework from Brunnermeier and Parker 
(2005). In this model economic agents are forward looking. Believing that an asset they invest 
in will pay well make them better off.  
 
Hence, this behaviour generates first order gain with the increase in anticipatory utility and a 
second order loss because of the distort behaviour. Moreover, agents may choose not to 
distort beliefs when large amounts are at stake. 
 
In a subsequent paper (2007) the authors show that as the cost of holding biased beliefs is 
second order, agents hold biased judgments about probability distributions. Therefore, they 
under diversify their portfolios and exhibit a preference for skewed assets that allow greater 
first order anticipatory pleasure. The rising demand for skewed assets lead to a lowering of 
their incomes. 
 
 
 
5.2. Delayed earnings 
 
One may desire to postpone possible bad outcomes because it makes him better off. Several 
papers investigate this possibility with medical testing. Oster et al. (2011). They use a dataset 
containing people at risk with Huntington disease (HD) who report their subjective belief 
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about having the disease. The authors rank patients in 5 categories. Patients with low risk 
profile to carry HD (they exhibit no signs but have one of their parents affected), people with 
less than 50% of having HD, patients with a risk between 50 and 89% of having HD, patients 
with probabilities of having HD between 90 to 98% and patients surely affected by the 
disease. Overall they find that untested individuals are over optimistic about their chances not 
to carry HD. Indeed, people with clear signs of HD do not have a significantly higher testing 
rate than those with less signs. Only patients with non-ignorable signs report the highest 
testing rate. 
 
In another survey based experiment, Sieff and Loewenstein (1999) test reactions about HIV 
test results. They find that those who learnt they were positive to HIV experienced greater 
distress compared with others. However, regarding the anticipatory response provided by 
participants with post results responses the authors show that the anticipatory distress was 
higher than the actual distress felt by respondents. 
 
Delayed consumption also apply to positive outcomes. Loewenstein (1987) asked students in 
a survey based experiment the amount of money they would be willing to pay to receive or 
avoid certain outcomes. Among the possible outcomes several are pleasurable (movie star 
kiss) and others very unpleasant like an electric shock. He shows that participants are more 
willing to pay to delay very pleasurable outcomes to enjoy from some anticipation about this 
future outcome. Likewise, they are more willing to pay more to avoid unpleasant outcomes 
(see Figure 1 for a description of the experiment). 
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Figure 1. Description of the experiment made by Loewenstein in 1987. Extracted from Loewenstein (1987) 
 
 
5.3. Valuation 
 
Rottenstreich and Hsee investigate in two different papers subjective valuation. They find that 
investors valuating by feelings are very sensitive to extreme probabilities and less to their 
variations. People valuating by calculation however, present sensitivity on the entire range of 
probabilities (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 2. Probability weighting based on calculation (dot line) and feelings (continuous line). Extracted from Hsee and 
Rottenstreich (2004) 
 
In 2004 they conducted several survey based experiments. In the first experiment the authors 
manipulate the valuation process with a prior task. In the calculation condition subjects are 
asked to calculate some probabilities and in the feeling condition they are asked to answer 
their feeling about personalities. Then participants need to answer how much they are willing 
to pay for a set of Madonna CDs (5 or 10 depending on the version). In the feeling condition 
subjects are insensitive to the number of CDs in the bundle whereas they value more the 10 
CDs bundle in the calculation condition. They also find a “crossover” (participants value 
more the 5 CDs bundle in the feeling condition compared with the calculation condition and 
value less the 10 CDs bundle in the feeling condition compared with the calculation one) 
suggesting that feelings engendered by Madonna are affect poor. 
 
In another experiment they test affect rich and affect poor items to find whereas affect-rich 
items encourage feeling-valuation. Participants need to imagine that pandas have been 
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discovered and they are asked some donation. In one treatment only one panda has been 
discovered and in the other four pandas have been found. In the affect rich condition, pandas 
are presented with cute pictures whereas they are presented with dots (1 or 4 dots) in the 
affect pour condition. Donations lie between 0 and 50 dollars with 10 dollar increments. 
Overall donations were higher for saving four pandas than for one. But, insensitivity is 
extreme for the affect rich condition without any differences in donations between one and 
four pandas. The authors find the same crossover as in the the previous experiment. Subjects 
are more willing to donate to save one panda in the affect-rich condition than in the affect-
poor. 
 
In the last experiment, Hsee and Rottenstreich test the valuation sensitivity with negative 
affect-rich items. Participants are asked to pronounce jail penalty for up to 10 years for an 
individual accused of mugging. The two conditions are empathy (affect-rich) and no empathy 
(affect-poor). In the empathy condition subjects are asked to put themselves in the position of 
the victim. According to the authors’ predictions, sentences were less sensitive to scope than 
in the no empathy condition with a crossover.  
 
 
6. Investor behaviour through Neurofinance 
 
In the last section, we have seen that a large amount of financial literature investigates the 
individual investor behaviour, his performance, the way he forms his preferences and manage 
his portfolio allocation. Several findings are puzzling in the sense that they are not 
reconcilable with classic models of rational behaviour. This issue has been challenged in three 
ways. New models of investor behaviour have emerged taking into account different 
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behavioural biases inherent influencing financial decisions (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) 
and several empirical studies using field data support (or invalidate) these theories (Barber 
and Odean 2001). Another set of studies uses experiments to allow more control over the 
environment have also challenged these theories (Biais et al. 2005, Weber and Camerer 1998 
among others). 
 
Since late 1990’s another field is growing in Finance: Neurofinance. It adds to traditional 
experiments physiological measures such as fMRI or heart beat to test theories of the investor 
behaviour. These procedures allow researchers to have a direct access to the brain functioning 
during financial decision. Hence, many empirical and experimental studies have already 
challenged the standard economic view which assumes that investors decide maximizing their 
utility under the assumption that they behave in a rational way. Many questions about investor 
behaviour and deviations from rationality remain open, but several papers demonstrate that 
deviating from rationality may be optimal, allowing instantaneous well-being (Brunnermeier 
and Parker 2005), or maximization is impossible (Simon, 1959). Therefore, investors are 
satisfying rather than maximizing (Cohen, 2005). 
 
In the following section, we will discuss the neural foundation of decision making under 
uncertainty and the main behavioural biases through Neurofinance. 
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6.1. Quick insight on the different brain regions and their involvement in 
human behaviour 
6.1.1.  The cortex 
 
Figure 3. Cortex functions. Picture is extracted from Peterson (2010) 
 
 
6.1.2. The reward system 
 
The reward system is the coordinator of searching, evaluation, and the motivated potential 
rewards. Dopamine neurotransmitters are the main vector of signals transmission through the 
reward system.   
The	cortex	is	the	logistical	center	of	the	brain
executive	function	&	
motor	control	 abstract	thinking,	
planning,	calculation,	
learning,	& strategic	
decision-making	
the	source	of	primitive	
motivations	& emotions	
(including	fear	&
excitement)
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Figure 4. Description of the reward system. Extracted from Peterson (2010) 
 
 
6.1.3. Loss avoidance system 
 
The loss avoidance system finds its origin in the limbic system. It is the centre of fear and 
danger. Anterior insula and amygdala are particularly involved in loss avoidance It is 
activated when threats are at stake. Emotions like anxiety, fear and panic find their origin in 
this system. Physiological events of the activation of this system are an increased level of 
stress, pain and panic. 
 
 
 
 
Brain’s Reward System
 
Dopamine was historically called the “pleasure” chemical of the brain. 
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Figure 5. Regions involved in the loss avoidance system. Extracted from Peterson (2010) 
 
 
6.2. Decision making under uncertainty 
 
In the traditional expected utility theory, risk averse agents will only choose a risky action if 
the utility derived exceeds the utility derived from an alternative riskless choice. This theory 
lies on the following assumptions; First agents know with certainty the possible outcomes and 
their related probabilities. Second, agents have the capacities to calculate their expected 
utility. Hence, under this assumption an agent is able to probability weighting. 
 
 Different brain regions are at stake regarding expected utility. Knutson et al. (2001) 
demonstrate the role of three different subcortical regions with fMRI imaging in the 
expectation of monetary rewards. In their study participants are asked to perform a task in 
exchange of a monetary reward at the end of the experiment. Once in the scanner, participant 
saw several figures representing potential gains and losses, appearing for variable intervals of 
time. Afterwards they are shown a white target square which appears for a variable length of 
Brain’s Reward System
 
Dopamine was historically called the “pleasure” chemical of the brain. 
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time. Subjects trigger the win or the loss by pressing a button. They are then shown a 
feedback of their earning (or loss) as well as their cumulative earnings. Results show that 
while subjects anticipate a reward ventral striatum is activated and while they receive the 
reward, the ventromedial frontal cortex is activated. 
 
In another study on increasing rewards and punishment, using a similar experimental design, 
Knutson et al. (2001) find that anticipation of increasing rewards leads a rise of the self-
reported happiness, NAcc (nucleus accumbens) activation and medial caudate activation, 
while anticipation of punishment activates neither. However, only the NAcc is correlated with 
self-reported happiness.  
 
These two results show an increasing activation of NAcc during gains anticipation but not 
losses. Besides, NAcc is a region rich in dopaminergic transmitters that are known to be 
linked with positive monetary rewards (Breiter et al. 2001) as well as the use of drugs, 
especially cocaine (Breiter et al. 1997). 
 
According the Prospect Theory, gains and losses are processed the same way by investors. 
Hence, as NAcc is only active during anticipation of positive outcomes it can be the brain 
substrate of expected utility. 
 
We have shown that NAcc is active when anticipation of monetary rewards is at stake only. 
Knutson et al. (2003) investigate the involvement of another brain region during the reception 
of a monetary reward. They find that the mesial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) is active during the 
assessment of a monetary reward. Hence, present utility and expected utility involve different 
brain regions.  The subcortical brain (with NAcc) for the expected monetary rewards and the 
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prefrontal cortex (labelled as more human specific) for the outcomes realization (see Figure 3 
for a description of the reward system). 
 
However, Knutson et al. (2005) fail to find a brain region involved when anticipated losses 
are at stake. 
 
Causse et al. (2011) investigate the plan continuation error (PCE) that make aircraft pilots. 
Pilots exhibiting this kind of errors are more willing to pursue flight plans despite bad 
meteorological conditions. They hypothesize that large and strong of negative emotional 
consequences, including economic pressure favours PCE.  They test their prediction over 19 
volunteers who perform simulated landing tasks. They find that volunteers exposed to the 
economic pressure exhibit lower reaction time suggesting lower level of reasoning before 
making the decision compared with the control group.  
 
 
6.3. Assessing risk and ambiguity 
 
In the previous studies from Knutson we reviewed, participants were aware of the 
probabilities associated with the possible outcomes. Hsu et al. (2005) investigate the neural 
process of risk with two different treatments with fMRI. In the first condition subjects know 
the probabilities of the possible outcomes (risk) and in the other condition they do not fully 
know the probability distribution (ambiguity). They find that the orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) 
and the amygdala are the most active regions during ambiguity. The OFC is implicated in 
cognition processes and emotion integration while amygdala is involved when reacting to 
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emotional cues. Neither of these regions are active during the risk condition. Therefore, they 
are specific to ambiguity. 
 
Amygdala is known to be involved in fear responses. Hence we can assume that participants 
under ambiguity experience fear when they are unable to fully understand the outcomes 
likelihood. 
 
 
6.4. Loss aversion 
 
In Prospect Theory, investors are less sensitive to gains than losses. The latter is viewed as a 
negative deviation from the investor own reference point. In addition, they value shifts from 
this reference point in a decreasing way. As an example, people perceive a shift from 1% to 
2% as a bigger increase than a shift from 40% to 41%. They are risk averse in the gain region 
whereas they are risk seekers in the loss region. This explains the concavity of their utility 
function in the gain region and the concavity in the loss region. 
 
Shiv et al. (2005) propose a neural test of myopic loss aversion. To that extend they compare 
outcomes earned by different groups of participants. The first group (normal) is formed of 19 
healthy participants without any brain damages. The second group (target group) consists of 
15 patients with brain damages in regions involved in the emotion processing such as 
amygdala or orbitofrontal cortex. The third group is composed of 7 control patients with brain 
lesions not involved in emotion processing. Each participant plays a lottery game. At the 
beginning of the experiment, they are endowed with 20 virtual dollars. They make several 
rounds of investing decisions where in each round they need to decide whether they want to 
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invest 1 dollar or not invest. If the subject decide to invest the experimenter toss a coin with 
50% of losing 1 dollar and 50% of chance to earn 2.50 dollars. The game end after 20 rounds. 
 
The authors make the assumption that patients with brain lesions involving emotion 
processing will be less risk averse than the control group since they are not affected by fear 
anymore. In the present study fear in induced by monetary losses. Results show that patients 
in the target group are more willing to take risks, investing more than 80% of the rounds on 
average compared with the two other groups investing around 60% of the time. On average 
they also earned higher outcomes from the game with average earnings about 25.70 dollars 
than other groups (respectively 22.80 and 20 for normal subjects and control group). 
 
Furthermore, target patients do not exhibit increasing risk aversion when facing previous 
losses compared with other groups. They continue to invest whatever they win or lose while 
other participants show greater risk aversion when facing previous losses. 
 
This result shows that when fear is involved in the neural process it alters judgment and “the 
negative side of emotions” inhibits the capacity one may have to think clearly. 
 
 
6.5. Genetic component of trading behaviour 
 
Gambling, novelty seeking and drugs addiction have the same neural circuitry. The 
dopaminergic reward circuitry is known to be the “pleasure centre” of the human brain. 
Indeed, Breiter et al. (1997) show that dopaminergic circuits are involved in cocaine addict 
behaviour. However, the authors show that dopaminergic activity is solely linked with the 
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craving phase. This result is consistent with the classic economic theory which disconnect 
utility from money with goods gained with. 
 
Several papers have investigated the link existing between risk taking behaviour and genetic 
components. Stenstrom et al. (2011) test the impact of testosterone and risk taking. They use 
the second-to-fourth-digit-ratio (2D:4D) and the length of the second finger relative to the 
sum of the lengths of all four fingers (rel2) as a proxies of prenatal exposure to testosterone 
across five topics: financial, recreational, social, ethical and health risk taking behaviours. 
They find that lower rel2 is predictive of greater risk taking in the financial, social and 
recreational domains and lower 2D:4D is predictive of greater risk taking in social and 
recreational domains. 
 
Using data on identical twins completing portfolio financial decisions, Barnea et al. (2010) 
find a genetic component explaining around 30% of the variation in stock market 
participation and asset allocation. The authors show that while the family environment has a 
measurable effect on young individuals’ behaviour, this effect does not last as the the 
individual gains experience. They argue that twins who grow up in similar environment as 
well as twins growing up in different environment exhibit the same investment behaviour 
beyond a common genetic component. 
 
Coates and Herbert (2008) test the effects of the endocrine system on financial risk taking on 
London City traders. They find that trader’s morning level of testosterone is a good indicator 
of his day profitability and that his cortisol level increases with the variance of his portfolio 
and the market volatility.  Hence, testosterone is correlated with good performance and 
cortisol with uncertainty. Furthermore, cortisol is known to influence brain regions linked 
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with irrational financial decisions. Thus as cortisol fluctuates with risk and returns it may alter 
trader’s ability to make optimal decisions. 
 
In another paper, Coates et al. (2009) use 2D:4D as a predictor of future financial success 
among traders. 2D:4D has been proved as a good predictor of future success in highly 
competitive sports already. The authors demonstrate that 2D:4D predicts long-term 
profitability and the number of year traders remain in the business. 
 
Frydman et al. (2010) test the effects of several genes on financial risk taking behaviour with 
a simple gamble game. They find that people with MAOA-L gene are more likely to take 
financial risks compare to MAOA-H carriers but only when it is advantageous given their 
preferences. MAOA-L carriers exhibit higher connectivity between prefrontal cortex and 
amygdala and the gene is known to contribute to aggressive and impulsive behaviour. Hence, 
they are more willing to take risks. 
 
 
6.6. Emotion regulation 
 
Lo and Repin (2002) propose to test the emotional decision making process on 10 
professional traders, taking biofeedback measures such as heart rate, skin conductance and 
blood pressure as proxies for these emotions. The authors show that traders exhibit greater 
emotional arousal around important events such as volatility peaks. They also demonstrate 
that experienced traders experience less these emotional arousals than less experienced ones. 
The authors argue that making quick decisions based on their emotional arousal is a necessary 
condition to in the decision making in traders. 
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Knutson et al. (2008) investigate the effect of positive anticipatory exciting environmental 
signals on risk taking behaviour in financial markets. They conduct an fMRI experiment on 
young student males. Before trails they are shown sexy female pictures. The authors find that 
risk taking is increased after an activation of the subject’s nucleus accumbens via this prior 
picture. Therefore, subjects are more likely to participate in lower expected value gambles. 
 
 Porcelli and Delgado (2009) investigate the effects of acute stress on financial making 
decisions. In their experiment, stress is induced to subjects by immersion of one hand in cold 
water for several minutes. Non stressed control subjects follow the same procedure with hot 
water. Participants are than asked to perform a recognition memory task to check for the 
stress induction. Subjects participate in a gambling game where they face two alternatives 
either presented in a gain manner or in a loss manner. In one set participants are offered 80% 
of chance to to lose 0.75$ and 20% of chance to lose 3$. Alternatively, in another set of 
alternatives they are offered to win 1.5$ with 40% of chance and 60% of chance to win 1$. 
Another set of gambles has other probabilities. During the task, skin conductance is measured. 
Results show a significantly increase increase in skin conductance levels in the stress 
condition and stressed participants made riskier choices.  Moreover, participants under stress 
made riskier choices in the loss domain compared with non-stressed and less risky choices 
than non-stressed in the win domain. 
 
The authors argue that acute stress alter financial decision taking. They tend to use kind of 
automatized risk biases. The suppose that if stress disrupt resources usually used by the brain 
executive functions that may lead to an excess reliance on low level automatized systems. 
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Andrade et al. (2015) test the relationship between excitement and bubbles. Their experiment 
follows the experimental design of Smith et al. (1988). Participants trade an asset with a finite 
life of 15 rounds in a continuous double auction game. The asset pays a random dividend after 
each round with possible values of 0, 8, 28 and 60 cents. Hence, before the first round the 
asset fundamental value is 3.60 dollars decreasing by 24 cents after each round. In each 
market, three traders are endowed with 18 dollars and 1 share, three others receive 14.40 
dollars and two stocks and the last three receive 10.80 dollars and three shares. Before the 
experiment starts, the experimenter shows participants a video tape to introduce emotions to 
participants. The emotional states that can be introduced are fear, calm and excitement. The 
authors find that bubbles are much larger in the excitement state than the others. The bubble 
amplitude in round 1 (difference between the average trading price of the asset and its 
fundamental value) is about 72 while it is respectively about 10.9 and 4 in the calm and fear 
treatments. This result suggest that excitement generated by increase prices in real stock 
markets fuel bubbles. 
 
Emotions play a role in the beliefs formation process of investors. In the third chapter of this 
thesis we propose an experimental test of the Brunnermeier and Parker model (2005). In their 
paper they show that agents who form optimistic beliefs about their future outcomes make 
them happier. This belief has an immediate impact on their subjective well-being via 
anticipatory emotions, and encourage them to prefer skewed assets. In our experiment, we use 
two equal lotteries except for their Skewness. One has a positive skewness and the other a 
skewness equal to zero. Half participants in our study play the skewed lottery, while the other 
half play the non-skewed lottery.  We show that subjects participating in the non-skewed 
lottery exhibit greater self-regulation than other subjects. Hence, they are less prone to 
optimism. Furthermore, we show that all participants feel positive anticipatory emotions 
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during the waiting interval between the revelation of the lottery and the results drawing, 
starting from the second minute of the waiting period. Finally, we show that the happiness felt 
by participants when learning their payoffs is as powerful as the anticipatory emotion they felt 
during the waiting period. 
 
 
6.7. Intertemporal choices 
 
McClure et al. (2004) demonstrate in an fMRI experiment discount future rewards. They look 
for smaller and sooner rather than larger ones. 
 
The authors exhibit that time discounting is under the influence on the limbic system which is 
specifically activated when one faces possibility of an immediately available reward and the 
prefrontal and parietal regions that are involved whatever the delay. Hence, it appears that 
during a time discounting decision, both regions compete against each other.  
 
When the limbic system is more activated, it is more likely that a sooner reward will be 
chosen. But, subjects who choose longer and larger rewards exhibit a greater activation of the 
latter region. This region is associated with cognitive tasks such as calculation and planning. 
 
 
6.8. Framing effect 
 
De Martino et al. (2006) test framing effect with fMRI imaging. In their experiment, 
participant receive at the beginning of each session their initial endowment. Afterwards, 
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subjects have to choose between a “sure” and a “gambling” options framed differently. The 
sure option is expressed positively as a gain (you keep…) or as a loss (you lose…). The 
gambling option is presented the same way with a pie chart expressing the probabilities. 
 
The results show that subjects are very sensitive to framing. They are risk averse when frames 
are expressed as gains, preferring the sure option over the gamble one. Solely 43% of 
participants in that condition choose to gamble. On the other hand, when frames are expressed 
as losses participants are risk seekers. More than 60% of subjects in that condition choose to 
gamble. These results are in line with Prospect Theory. 
 
The authors also find that amygdala seems to mediate framing. Indeed, it is activated with 
gain frames for both sure and gamble conditions. Furthermore, they show an activation of the 
orbital and medial prefrontal cortex, region associated with reasoning, in subjects less 
sensitive to framing. Put another way, the more rational subjects behave the more OMPC is 
activated. Overall, framing (gain and loss) is linked with amygdala activation, known as an 
emotional centre and as being involved in learning, danger and value-related predictions. 
 
 
6.9. Disposition effect 
 
Frydman et al. (2014) propose a neural test of the disposition effect. They find robust results 
on three main predictions. First, when a participant will decide to sell a stock, brain activity in 
areas associated with encoding the value of the potential action at the time of the decision will 
be proportional to the difference between the sale and the purchase price. Hence, they expect 
brains areas involved in computation of the values of different options to be positively 
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correlated with the capital gained (ventromedial prefrontal cortex). Second, participants 
strongly influenced by realization utility will exhibit greater disposition effect (subjects with 
vmPFC activity at the selling time highly correlated with potential gain). Finally, when 
participants realize a capital gain they get a positive burst of utility (inversely a negative burst 
when they realize a loss) that should lead to an increasing activation of the ventral stratium 
which encodes changes in net present value of lifetime utility. 
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Chapter 2: Risk Aversion, Asset Allocation and the 
Role of Banks around Financial Crises 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The relation between individual investors’ risk aversion and its influence on investors’ asset 
allocation is the aim of this article. Nevertheless, we examine the expectations of the clients 
relative to their banks in the scope of the 2008-2011 financial crises. In order to test our 
researches, we use questionnaire survey data submitted to asset managers in 4 representative 
countries in Europe (Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg) and we compare the 
results obtained with time series data between June 2004 and June 2012 for the same 
countries. Our results show that when considering the investors’ endowment, the wealthiest 
are the less risk averse and this has not changed with the financial crisis. Another main 
finding is their investment strategy; it is less conservative for wealthy investors. However, 
when we look at the expectations of investors on their financial intermediaries, all expect 
more transparence as well as more reputation and more client services. Therefore, these 
results need to be weighted by country as investors’ investment strategies depend also on 
countries specificities such as taxes. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Analysing the individual investors’ behaviour is a wide topic of the literature in finance. 
Numerous papers in theoretical, empirical and experimental finance address this issue. It is 
well known that investors are sensitive to social biases such as age and social status 
(Cervellati et al. 2010) and cognitive biases such as overconfidence (Kahneman & Tversky 
1992), disposition effect (Odean 1998), or experience (Malmendier & Nagel 2010). 
 
Therefore, the understanding of the changes of the investors’ behaviour around financial crisis 
is still an ongoing question. For that purpose, the recent 2008 financial crisis provides a good 
natural experiment. Several papers yet demonstrate changes in individual investors’ behaviour 
during financial crisis, nevertheless little is known regarding the differences in behaviour 
between different types of investors in different countries and the impact of the financial crisis 
on investors’ expectations about their financial intermediaries. 
 
In this article we test individual risk aversion for different levels of endowment, using banks 
customers splitting (retail and wealthy). We then investigate the investors’ risk appetite 
regarding their demand for the most common financial products and their investment policies.  
We also perform several analyses to see whether or not we would be able to distinguish some 
changes in behaviour, and if existing, are linked to their confidence in their financial 
intermediaries. 
 
We show that, when considering the investors’ endowment, the wealthiest are the less risk 
averse and this has not changed with the financial crisis. We also found that, regarding their 
investment strategy, it is less conservative for wealthy investors. However, when we look at 
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the expectations of investors on their financial intermediaries, all expect more transparency as 
well as more reputation and more client services. 
 
The literature highlights the split existing between wealthier investors and the others as well 
as cases when high payoffs are available. Indeed, Holt and Laury (2002) have shown that 
when payoffs are low and hypothetical most subjects are risk averse. However, they become 
more risk averse when available payoffs increase. High incentives have an impact on 
investors’ risk aversion. Bombardini and Trebbi (2005) is extent of Holt and Laury with 
payoffs above half a million dollars. They also found that with high payoffs individuals tend 
to become more risk averse. Our results do not support these results as in our case wealthier 
investors have not changed their risk aversion level. Other papers such as Perraudin and 
Sorensen (2000) or Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) have shown that the wealth share invested in 
risky assets increases with wealth. Makarov and Schornick (2010) demonstrate the same 
behaviour with a CARA framework in which wealthier investors’ acquire more costly 
information and so more knowledge in financial markets thus decreasing their level of 
uncertainty. 
 
When considering the impact of the financial crisis on investors’ behaviour, Hoffman et al. 
(2012) show that investors’ return expectations decrease when they experience a month with 
bad returns, especially in September and October 2008 (peak of the crisis), using a monthly 
survey on Dutch brokerage data between 2008 and 2009. They also notice that, although 
investors’ risk tolerance and perceptions are stable on the long-term, it fluctuates in periods of 
crisis, especially in June 2008 (first month with bad returns) and September 2008: investors’ 
risk appetite decreases when stock markets go badly. They also show the temporary nature of 
the investors’ fall in risk tolerance together with an increase in risk perception. During the 
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crisis and especially in June and September 2008, investors’ risk tolerance (perception) 
strongly decreases (increases) for getting back at a normal level at the end of the sample in 
March 2009. 
 
Regarding the changes in investors’ investment strategies, the literature is divided. Despite the 
common assumption that investors rebalance their portfolios in order to decrease risk levels 
and increase liquidity, some empirical studies show that, on the one hand, investors decrease 
the level of risk of their portfolio, but on the other hand, increase their trading activity 
(Bateman et al., 2011). Hoffman et al. (2012) show a more mixed result. The investors’ 
monthly returns track the market volatility with a spike in October 2008. This shows that 
during the height of the crisis, investors do not seem to de-risk their portfolios. Investors may 
have been surprised by the sharp decrease in markets returns. Moreover, while the market 
volatility decreases after October 2008, at the investor level it does the opposite, being even 
higher than prior to the crisis in April 2008. 
 
Our contribution to the existing literature is twofold. Using qualitative and quantitative data 
from questionnaires submitted to financial intermediaries, we investigate the changes in 
individual investors’ behaviour, regarding their risk aversion, their investment policies and 
their expectations about their financial institutions. For that purpose, our sample is composed 
with data from four countries (Belgium, France, Germany and Luxembourg), accounting for 
48.5% of life assurance premiums and 49% of private banking clients, and are representative 
of the diversity of the 27 EU Member States, for two different types of customers (wealthy 
and retail ones) in 17 banks. 
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We then compare our results with time series data about different financial assets from the 
same countries. 
 
We compare countries apparently similar in terms of quality of life, geographically located in 
Central Europe and economically dependent and using the same currency. This last point is 
known to increase market dependence especially for large countries such as France and 
Germany (Söhnke et al. 2006). We test if countries responses to the crises are equivalent in 
terms of periods if these countries experience a decrease in investment rate, and if it occurs at 
the same time and amplitude. 
 
There is an extensive literature about financial crises and a particular focus on the 2008 sub 
primes crisis. Since 2009, Europe faces an unfolding sovereign debt crisis. We investigate the 
unicity of both crises should we consider them as a unique from 2008 to 2012, or should we 
distinguish them.  
 
The literature is still unclear about the effects of experience and knowledge on investors’ 
behaviour. Malmendier and Nagel (2010) demonstrate that investors who have experienced 
low stock-market returns throughout their lives report lower willingness to take financial risk, 
are less likely to participate in the stock market, invest a lower fraction of their liquid assets in 
stocks if they participate in financial markets, and are more pessimistic about future stock 
returns. Individuals who have experienced low bond returns are less likely to own bonds. In 
the same way, less experienced investors have less diversification in their portfolio than 
“knowledgeable” ones (Stambaugh, Yu and Yuan, 2011). Experience also has a great impact 
on retirement plans. Agnew and Skyzman (2005) show experimentally that people with low 
financial knowledge are more willing to choose a portfolio allocation which does not 
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adequately fit their need. This result is in line with van Rooij et al. (2007) where people 
consider themselves as conservative and financially unsophisticated regarding the pension 
fund domain. However results provided by Hoffman et al. (2012) and Glaser & Weber (2005) 
suggest that as the financial crisis has a temporary effect on investors’ behaviour it does not 
allow investors to learn from the crisis. 
 
In addition, despite the fact that a series of works highlights the insufficient diversification of 
individual portfolios, little is known about the changes the financial crisis has generated. We 
know that individuals tend to trend in concert. They buy and sell shares that are correlated 
(Kumar & Mc Lee, 2006) using US retail investors data between 1991 and 1996. They also 
concentrate their trades in both small and low-priced firms. Employees invest in higher 
proportion in the securities of companies in which they work (e.g. Holden & VanDerhei, 
2001, and Liang & Weisbenner, 2003) and, more generally, the attractiveness of an 
investment increases with its familiar appearance (Huberman, 2001, Chan et al., 2005). 
Nonetheless, we do not know if the crisis has generated more diversified portfolio allocations. 
Regarding our questionnaires data, our results suggest that risk aversion depends on investors’ 
endowment. Indeed, wealthy investors appear to be less risk averse than retail ones despite the 
fact that when we look at our qualitative results from the same questionnaire both types 
consider themselves as more risk averse since the crisis. 
 
We also notice that the crisis has affected investors’ preferences for low risk assets such as 
life insurance for retail investors. Our quantitative findings from questionnaires do not show a 
change for wealthy investors; however our qualitative findings suggest that they changed their 
investment policies since 2011, going back to more risky assets but with shorter duration. 
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We detect a change in investors’ expectations about their financial intermediaries since the 
crisis. Both types of investors report that the reputation of their financial institution has 
become an important criterion as well as the quality of client services and the transparency 
about fees and products. This last one was largely neglected before the crisis. 
 
When we consider country specificities, Belgian, French and German investors focus in a 
good balance between risk and return when Luxembourgers focus on long-term returns. 
 
Country specificities are also salient regarding investors asset preferences. Demand for 
structured products remains stable in France and Luxembourg while strongly decreasing in 
Belgium and Germany. Demand for equities remains stable in Germany but has significantly 
decreased in France. Cash deposits have slightly decreased in Belgium and France and are 
stable in Germany and Luxembourg. A switch to liquid investments was detected in Belgium, 
France and Germany. French investors have increased their liquidity levels but German 
investors have not. 
 
On aggregated items, our results from time series data suggest that the investment rate in 
financial assets by households has not changed with the crisis in Belgium, but has decreased 
in France (-5% in average) and in Germany (-2% in average).  The French households’ 
response to the crisis occurred earlier (from June 2007) than in Germany (from December 
2007). Contrary to Belgian and French households who have not changed the flow of their 
financial transactions, German households have increased them in average by 7 million Euros 
per quarter from December 2008. Globally, the crisis has had an effect on household 
behaviour with respect to mutual funds: Belgian response to the crisis was an outflow from 
mutual fund shares from June 2007 (-1.6 billion Euros in average). A similar pattern occurs in 
 
 
71 
France but later (from September 2009) and was more pronounced (-4.7 billion Euros in 
average). The German households have exhibited a strong divesture in mutual fund shares 
between June 2006 and March 2009, but recover a positive trend as early as June 2009. 
Regarding deposits of all forms held by households, no major changes occurred over the 
period. Only German households showed a strong positive peak during the last quarter of 
2008. In Belgium, France and Germany, the net sales of funds is negatively linked with the 
flow of total deposits held by households, which attests of the existing trade-off between 
deposits and the investment in funds’ shares. In Germany only, there is a strong link between 
the flows of direct holdings of all type of financial securities (bonds, equities, money market’s 
ones) and their mutual funds’ counterparts. 
 
On household direct holdings of financial securities (flow of holdings), our results are as 
follows. The average flow of equity holdings is positive in each of the 3 countries even if it 
appears strongly volatile in Belgium. The flow of equity holdings does not seem to have been 
influenced by the crisis in any of the 3 countries under consideration (Belgium, France and 
Germany). No major change in bonds has occurred in France despite the crisis. On the 
contrary, we have observed a positive average trend of 733 million Euros (vs – 3.4 billion 
Euros before) into bonds’ holdings by Belgian households after mid-2007. Conversely, a drop 
(with a strong peak in 2008) is observed in Germany since 2008 with an average flow of -3.2 
billion Euros. Household demand for money market securities experienced a temporary drop 
concentrated in 2009 for Belgian households, whereas this effect seems to be more permanent 
in France with an average negative flow of -380 million Euros since the beginning of 2009. 
German demand for such securities experienced a large volatility in 2008. 
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On household holdings of mutual fund shares (net sales), the net sales of equity funds appear 
to be very volatile. They have strongly declined only in France with the crisis: the average net 
sales have been of -3.4 billion Euros since June 2007. Regarding bond funds, the crisis has 
not had any impact in France. On the opposite, it has had a very temporary effect concentrated 
around the 2008 year with a large drop of the net sales in Germany and Luxembourg. The net 
sales of money market funds experienced, in average, a large drop of more than 11 billion 
Euros in France from mid-2009. This effect seems to be more permanent than that observed in 
Germany where they recover neutral values (around zero) from 2009. In Germany, a sharp 
temporary drop occurred during the crisis (from mid-2008 to late 2009).  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and the 
methodology employed throughout the paper. The results combining both a quantitative and 
qualitative analysis of the questionnaires which is compared to the time-series data related to 
the asked questions are described in the section 3. The last section serves as a conclusion.  
 
 
2. Research Methodology 
 
As 2008 and 2011 crisis are recent and complex phenomenon, we chose to construct a 
questionnaire divided into two parts, in order to distinguish two different approaches. The 
first part of the questionnaire is driven by semi-opened questions and the second part 
(qualitative part) is made of boxes to tick. 
 
Furthermore, this approach was judged the most efficient, in order to go as far as possible into 
details, enabling interviewees to raise any topic they wanted to. 
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Our approach allowed us to detect all types of investor behaviour changes before and after the 
crisis. The interviewed persons were questioned and we tried to dissect the specific themes 
into categories. We seek a constructive demarche to show the consequences of the change of 
investment that customers of these banks have taken over the two successive crises. We have 
also taken care to segregate types of investors in the questionnaire between retail clients and 
HNWI, but we tried to know the reasons for these changes through key issues. 
 
Selected companies were chosen in four different countries (France, Luxembourg, Belgium 
and Germany) and represent leading companies in their dedicated sector. 
 
18 major financial institutions (Private and Retail Banks as well as Insurance companies) 
were interviewed at a senior level: 5 in Belgium and Luxembourg1 and 4 in France and 
Germany. For most of them, we got answers from distinct senior managers operating in the 
respectively, retail and private, banking branches. Finally, we obtain 33 responses as follows: 
6 from Belgium and Luxembourg, 7 from France and 14 from Germany; 22 of them concern 
high net worth customers, and 11 retail ones (refer to Figure 4 in Appendix for demographical 
statistics about the sample used). Globally, these financial institutions represent more than 
50% of the banking market share in their respective countries. To avoid any possible 
misinterpretation of the questions as well as a high rate of responses to all questions, all the 
questionnaires have been completed by phone interviews in the own language of the 
respondent.  
 
                                                
1
	Given	that	Luxembourg	represents	the	major	“off-shore”	centre	for	the	3	countries	under	consideration	
(Belgium,	Germany	and	France),	especially	in	the	case	of	high	net	worth	households,	5	Private	Banks	operating	
from	Luxembourg	have	been	added.	
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In order to contrast some of the results obtained from the analysis of questionnaires’ 
responses, we collect flow-type quarterly data from June 2004 to June 2012 for the same 3 
countries under consideration (Belgium, France and Germany). In particular, we get data 
related to the questionnaires such as: the net sales of mutual funds’ shares regarding the major 
asset classes (Equities, Bonds, Money Market,), the direct ownership of these asset classes 
and the financial investment rate. Data come from the German Investment Fund Association 
(BVI), Central Banks (Banque de France, Deutsche Bundesbank), The European Fund and 
Asset Management Association (EFAMA), Eurostat and the OEE (European Savings 
Institute).  
 
 
2.1. Questionnaire description 
 
The questionnaires constructed for the interviews are divided in six different parts. 
  
The section 1 serves as an introduction of the questionnaire presenting to interviewees the 
purpose of the study, the audience we want to interview and, the approximate duration of each 
interview and a quick presentation of each part of the questionnaire. 
 
In section 2, we focus on respondents’ background such as gender, age, experience, the type 
of financial institution they work for and their area of activity. 
 
In section 3, we ask respondents to give us the general trends of asset allocation since the 
financial crisis for different types of assets (real estate, structured products…) based on a five 
points (from 1 to 5) scale from “strong decrease” to “strong increase”. As our questionnaires 
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mix qualitative and quantitative answers, we ask interviewees to give us their thinking about 
these changes. 
 
In section 4, we measure the changes in behaviour of their clients split into two categories: 
high net worth costumers (asset under management above 1 million Euros) and retail 
investors... The purpose of this section is to detect the changes in behaviour such as their risk 
aversion and their investment policies (changes in liquid investments, changes in asset 
duration…) with a five points scale from “strongly decreased” to “strongly increased”. We 
complement these questions with open questions on the same topics. Several questions serve 
to monitor the accuracy of the respondent’ answer: for instance, we ask a question relative to 
the risk aversion of their clients and later, relative to their risk appetite.  
 
The purpose of section 5 is to detect what are the most important expectations and opinions of 
the customers regarding the services provided by their financial advisor. The items we 
propose to interviewees were found by compiling items from other surveys on this topic. This 
section is composed of two questions in order to measure the changes due to the financial 
crisis: the same question is asked to interviewees in reference of their opinion before and after 
the crisis. They have to choose a maximum of three items among the following choices:  the 
firm reputation (denoted REP in the tables), the performance monitoring (denoted PM in the 
tables), the quality of client services (denoted QoS in the tables), the transparency about fees 
and products (denoted TANNY in the tables), the investment strategy (denoted IS in the 
tables), the number of investment products available (denoted NOP in the tables), the Asset 
allocation decisions (denoted AA in the tables), the actual performance of the fund (denoted 
FP in the tables), or other. We use a two points scale (0,1) to indicate respectively a negative 
or positive answer. 
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2.2. Qualitative Methodology 
2.2.1. Data Collection  
 
In order to collect answers, interviews were conducted by phone in the native language of 
each respondent. Qualitative questions were semi-opened questions and were designed to add 
value to the information collection. Interviews were conducted between October and 
November 2012. Each interview lasted between 30 to 45 minutes. Once collected, all 
interviews were transcripted into Word and a few German interviews were translated into 
English word by word.  In order to perform our qualitative analysis, we chose to use the 
Nvivo system to perform this analysis. Detailed notes were taken during the interviewes, also 
additional material such as presentation slides assisted us in our data collection and 
furthermore the analysis. 
 
All the transcripts were uploaded in Nvivo and classified as internal sources. Once uploaded 
in the system, our approach is to classify all the transcripts with classifications and provide 
attributes for each transcript. The data analysis started with open coding of the collected 
information from the available resources. 
Each attribute was already defined previously in the questionnaire, we decide to apply the 
same methodology, we define the gender (male or female), types of investors (retail banking, 
private banking, wealth management, or insurance), the age of the interviewee ( under 25, 25 
to 35, 36 to 45, 46 to 55, more than 56) the type of business (domestic, European level only or 
both), the country (France, Belgium, Luxembourg and Germany), the type of products (own 
products, products from other firms, both or involved in products development) and the 
working experience (less than 5 years, 5 to 9 years, 10 to 14 years, more than 20 years). 
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We decide to define the main themes before initiating the coding. All the semi-opened 
questions were used as a starting point, the themes were already pre-defined such as asset 
allocation, asset duration, changes in bank overall strategies, changes in priorities since the 
crisis, changes observed in governments bonds and the future of financial services. Then we 
applied a structural methodology (open coding) to deduct all the key categories and sub 
categories. We proceeded a general coding by subdividing all the categories, then once the 
first review was finalised we initiated a second coding review in order to improve the sub 
categories and themes. 
 
Once the answers classified, all themes and sub-themes from participants emerge into 
interesting quotes drawn by the raw data. 
 
Assisted by Nvivo we were able to make specific dies and a more generalized model that 
describes the impact of the two crises on the financial products and investors’ behavior, and 
we also deducted various matrixes based on our coding approach. 
 
 
2.2.2. Data Analysis 
 
Given the different schemes on the general model (figure 5) we deduct that there is an impact 
on the customers’ behaviour before the 2008 crisis and after the sovereign debt crisis. Most 
obvious change observed after the 2008 crisis, the customers starting acting differently. 
Customers have definitely changed their behaviors and became more risk averse on specific 
financial products such as structured products, fixed income and alternatives funds.  
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The lack of transparency and trust in the banking sector confirm that the customers were more 
willing to reduce the risk and reduce the duration of investments. During our qualitative 
research we noticed that the interviews mentioned a couple of times that their clients wanted 
to minimize the risk and ensure to secure their assets on a short-term period. It could explain 
why the majority of customers started investing in real estate, commodities and governments 
bonds, considered as secured assets during this timeframe. 
 
After the second major crisis, the sovereign crisis, we observe that the interviewees noticed 
some slights changes in customers’ behavior. Most of customers are still risk averse and have 
a lack of confidence in the banking sector. Therefore we notice that the clients started 
investing in another type of products considered as secured, with low returns – corporate 
bonds. The corporate bond issued by corporations, are considered as more secured and 
interesting for clients as these types of products are mainly used by companies who want to 
expand business and applied on long term. The term is usually applying to short-term period 
and with a maturity shorter than one year also known as commercial papers. 
 
 
2.2.3. Asset Allocation 
 
Following our research framework, we decide to summarize all the information collected by 
creating matrices. The first matrice will show all the different aspects recognised and analysed 
during our qualitative research on how the customers allocated their financial resources. 
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Given the variety of products per countries and type of investors, the type of allowance varies 
in function of different criteria such as the type of products and the size of investors’ 
portfolios. 
 
Overall we observe that all the countries were affected by the lower investment in alternative 
funds after the crisis, the financial system that have led customers to look for more secured 
assets, and tend to decrease their positions in alternatives funds, except the HNWI German 
investors who kept a risk appetite for alternative products as mentioned one HNWI, Head of 
Private Banking in Germany “we need for investments which remains independent from the 
inflation”. 
 
Even though the customers are more turned to secured products and such as commodities, 
cash deposits and corporate bonds since the 2008 crisis. We can say that all the countries are 
concerned with these changes in asset allocation.  
 
We find that increased investment in France, Germany, Luxembourg and Belgium for all 
types of customers’ retail and HNWI, they are willing to secure cash despite a low yield. This 
change can be sponsored by a greater aversion to risks post crisis. Some customers are also 
expecting more flexibility in investing in these kind of products. Commodities are considered 
as a “safe investment” due to the fear of inflation, clients invest in secure and proper products. 
The investments in commodities allow the retail clients to diversify their portfolio with less 
risk than what expected with volatile products. 
 
Concerning other type of products such as equities and fixed income, we discover that all our 
interviewees, even these working in private banking, asset management and retail banking 
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noted a decrease for these products. They confirmed that all the customers are no longer 
aiming to invest due to the product complexity and lack of transparency. The market volatility 
after the 2008 crisis impacted these products, customers especially HNWI in Germany 
mentioned these products are “unattractive” with low returns. The desertification of 
investments in equities and fixed income are well known after the 2008 crisis and the 
European sovereign debt crisis. 
 
The investment in life insurance is down significantly across countries, for example, in France 
the decline was less significant than in other countries, where one finds among customers in 
the private banking that the decrease is related to the lack of attractiveness of the product, the 
low investment return and duration. Another significant example in the panel of interviewees, 
some have noticed that their retail customers are not driven by crating ratings but rather by 
lower guaranteed interest rates. 
 
One can also see a significant increase in the real estate investment, which impacts all the 
types of customers in Belgium, France, Luxembourg and Germany back in force investment 
in real estate, considered as a safe haven. The after 2008 certainly had a significant impact on 
lowering prices, but generally retail and HNWIs are likely finding in the real estate, a good 
investment and a higher return on the long term. 
 
We find a different pattern for the structured products and the money markets funds, the 
HNWI are now willing to invest more in structured products after the 2008 crisis, especially 
the German and the Luxembourg investors. Therefore, we see that for the retail customers, the 
risk appetite has decreased due to lack of transparency and market volatility. 
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Otherwise we notice that the government bonds were treated significantly in our case study, 
this type of investments is really specific in the questionnaire. We see that the interviewees 
distinguished two time periods: before the 2008 crisis and after the European sovereign debt 
crisis. 
 
Before the sovereign debt crisis, the governments bonds were not considered as attractive 
products. In the retail banking sector, the customers were aiming to invest in government 
bonds, like in France, even if the low yields and interests were significant, the safety and the 
trust of French government drove the customers to invest. In Luxembourg and Belgium, the 
same event occurred, the retail investors and HNWI invested in government bonds, as the risk 
minimization guaranteed by the state were configured. The simplification of products and the 
decrease of rates ensure the confidence of customers.  
In Germany, we see that HNWIs are more inclined to invest with support from the German 
government. The financial and economic strength of the country has led to an increased 
appetite for these investments because the Germans after the crisis had much faith in their 
government. 
 
After the sovereign debt crisis, the interviewees talked about the changes occurred, and it 
seems that the investors and the governments bonds have significantly decreased in all the 
countries. The trust and the confidence in allEuropean governments and how they handled the 
crisis in Europe with the collapse of Greece market, marked a turning point in the European 
economy. Investors including retail clients and HNWI have significantly reduced the purchase 
of governments bonds in France, Luxembourg and Belgium. However, Germany has 
experienced a slight decline, only HNWIs continued to invest but by taking precautions. 
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2.2.4. Asset Duration 
 
During our case study, we also constructed a matrice allocated to the changes of asset 
duration. The asset duration results of changes in customers’ behaviour after 2008 crisis and 
the impacts assessments.  
 
After the 2008 crisis, globally the customers’ behaviour has been modified and the way of 
investments have also evolved for retail customers and HNWI. 
 
One of the most significant changes occurred was on the type of duration, the customers are 
now more willing to invest in short term rather long term. The infatuation of short term 
investment results from different factors and we can explain these changes by changes in all 
the markets conditions, the interviewees mentioned that the retail customers are investing on 
short term, to avoid risk and product complexity. The HNWI shared the same opinion and are 
also investing on short term in order to avoid risk. The decrease of higher returns is also one 
of the major impacts of the change in asset duration. 
 
On the other hand, the long term investment is decreasing significantly due to markets 
practices and risk aversion to products complexity. The potential change can be explained by 
the lessened attractivity of certain financial products, and the feeling that long duration might 
also impact other types of customers’ behaviour.  
 
The attractivity of the market is down and customers tend to develop feelings of insecurity in 
face of investments in which they want to invest their financial portfolios. 
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After the crisis of 2008, HNWIs and retail clients have evolved their risk perception. 
Customers tend to invest in the products or companies that have solid values, they seek to 
build a clearer trust with their bankers. This distrust of the bankers and the growing inflation 
pushed the shareholders change strategies, and investing but certainly assess risks and seeking 
for more secured investments. 
 
 
2.2.5. Changes in the priorities in financial services since 2008 
 
The changes in priorities of the banking sector is one of the major consequences of the crisis, 
the way in which banks and firms have adopted the change are radical or moderate to try to 
win back the market and the confidence of their customers. During the interviews, we asked 
our stakeholders to express what their customers ask them and how they can evolve 
mentalities. 
 
The companies must face changes and need to re-think their strategy toward customers. In the 
private banking sector, some interviewees affirmed that the financial sector must evolve and 
challenge their economic model, a need to find new sources of growth and develop a new 
commercial approach with clients. In the retail sector, the interviewees said that the bankers 
should adapt themselves to their customer’s needs. 
 
The regulatory and the reputation of the banking sector have also impacted; a few 
interviewees mentioned that after the 2008 crisis, we have seen an emerging of regulatory 
laws in Europe and in the rest of all the financial places. This increase forces bankers to 
reduce the risk and ensure a certain safety and solvency of their products. Being compliant 
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with local laws and regulations ensures bankers and investors to have a new way to do 
business. 
 
A couple of interviewees in the private banking confirm that the reputation increased more 
after the sovereign debt crisis, due to the government controls and empowerment. The 
multibancarism, the decrease of pricing have also a huge impact on banks. Investors tend to 
diversify their placement assets between various banks. Interviewees in the Asset 
Management companies mentioned that it assists customers to decrease the pricing fees 
towards their placements. It enables customers to play with their portfolios and improve the 
diversification of theirs assets and returns. Another aspect also noticed when we performed 
our analysis is that the customers are looking for a better quality of services; all the domains 
in banking are touched. We noticed that there is a constant demand of customers to increase 
the quality of service, institutional corporations should be more flexible and adapt their 
languages and skills set to their clients. Customers are more and more expecting since the 
different financial crisis a better understanding of their needs but also a better digitization of 
online services. Customers have evolved and the financial sector needs also to improve and 
adapt themselves to the current trend of markets and clients. 
 
 
3.  Statistical methodology 
 
Given the weak number of data points obtained whether by questionnaires (33 points) or by 
time-series (33 points as well), we only apply non-parametric statistical procedures. The 
objective of the quantitative study of questionnaires is to extract the differences in the 
behaviours/opinions according to two dimensions (country-type and costumer-type): the 
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country in which the bank is based (Belgium, France, Germany, or Luxembourg) and the type 
of investors (retail customers or high net worth ones).We use the Kruskal-Wallis test to 
compare the different samples: 2 in the case of the costumer-type analysis and 4 in the case of 
the country-type one. It allows to test if the different samples come from populations with 
identical properties.  
 
 
We compute the K statistics as follows: 
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where ni is the size of sample i, N is the sum of the ni's, and Ri is the sum of the ranks for 
sample i. 
 
The K statistics follows a Chi-square distribution with (k-1) degrees of freedom.  Given the 
weak number of observations in each sample (sometimes only 6), the computation of the p-
value is also obtained thanks to a Monte-Carlo study with 10 000 random resampling. We 
then obtain a 99% confidence interval for the p-value. In the case where there are more than 2 
samples for the considered variable (per country analysis), if the p-value is such that the null 
hypothesis (all the samples come from identical populations) is to be rejected, then at least 
one sample is different from another. To identify which samples are responsible for rejecting 
the null hypothesis, we utilise the multiple pairwise comparisons using the Steel-Dwass-
Critchlow-Fligner procedure (see Hollander and Wolfe, 1999). 
 
Regarding the time-series data, we use the Pettitt’s homogeneity test to determine if we may 
consider that a series is homogeneous over time, or if there is a time at which a change occurs 
due to the financial crisis. The Pettitt's test (see Pettitt, 1979) is a nonparametric test that 
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requires no assumption about the distribution of data. It is an adaptation of the rank-based 
Mann-Whitney test that allows identifying the time at which the shift occurs. 
 
In the tables, all figures in bold are statistically significant at the 5% risk level, whereas they 
are underlined if it is only the case at the 10% risk level. We usually provide the tables 
corresponding to the non-parametric tests only when they exhibit statistically significant 
results. 
 
 
4. Discussion methodology and sample 
 
We have in our scope wealthy institutional customers and retail customers; we are fully aware 
that this split is not bullet proof.  We use the split commonly used in the banking industry and 
communicated by interviewees. Therefore, the only issue is when wealthy investors hold 
different multiples portfolios in various banks (it will be categorised as retail although as they 
are billionaire). The only way to avoid this bias would be to get access to portfolios data for 
each investor in our scope. We did not have the possibility to access this data.   
 
We have in our questionnaire 4 West European countries (France, Belgium, Germany and 
Luxembourg); therefore, Luxembourg is excluded from flow-type quarterly data. We notice 
during interviews with bankers that native Luxembourgish individual investors are very few, 
that explains the lack of data collected for this country. 
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5. Results 
2.3. Risk Aversion 
 
Globally, risk aversion has increased with the crisis but it is not a very strong phenomenon 
(see table 1a). There are no major differences in the behaviour of clients when the four 
countries are considered separately. When we restrict the analysis by types of costumers, it 
appears that risk aversion has largely increased for retail investors while no change can be 
detected for high net worth individuals (see table 1b). The joint analysis of the responses 
regarding either risk aversion or risk appetite demonstrates a strong consistency. 
 
If we look at the customers’ behaviour changes in qualitative way, all the interviewees have 
highlighted that all their clients became more risk averse.  The retail customers became more 
risk averse before the 2008 subprime crisis while HNWI remain the same, due to a larger 
diversification in their portfolios allocations. We can also notice that all these feelings have 
been detailed in the questions relative to the increase or decrease of the demand for some 
types of investments and in the questions relative to clients’ assets allocation and assets 
duration. From a qualitative point of view, a margin effect of the crisis on retail customer 
appears to be feared They become more risk averse and look for more secure and liquid 
investments in order to protect themselves from an uncertain future. 
 
The difference between quantitative and qualitative answers could come from the difference 
between the perception investors have on their risk aversion and their real behaviour.  
 
To confirm these findings on risk aversion, we analyse the aggregate time-series of the 
financial investment rate in each of the 3 countries under consideration. It is calculated by 
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dividing the net acquisition of financial assets (cash and deposits, any type of securities, life 
insurance) of households by their disposable income. Since the risk taking behaviour is 
governed by expectations and risk attitudes, the evolution through time of the financial 
investment rate may capture the household’s aversion towards financial investments. 
 
Belgian, French and German households do not display similar behaviour (zero correlation) 
regarding their investment rate in financial assets (see table 1c). Whereas it seems not to have 
been influenced by the crisis in Belgium, it has strongly declined with the crisis in France (-
4.3% in average) and only slightly in Germany (-2.3% in average). The French households’ 
response to the crisis occurs earlier (from June 2007) than in Germany (from December 
2007). The investment rate in Belgium is much higher (more than 12% in average with 
respect to 9.4% and 8.4% in average in France and Germany respectively) and volatile than in 
France and Germany. It reached a peak of roughly 25% at the beginning of the sample (June 
2004). France and Germany are comparable, to each other, with a slightly higher participation 
in France. The evolution of this rate through time exhibits no similarities among the 3 
countries under consideration (see figure 1). 
 
 
6. Asset Allocation 
 
It was asked to interviewees to what extent the demand for real estate, structured products, 
equities, cash deposits, commodities, traditional life insurances, balanced assets, money 
market instruments, fixed income products and alternative investments has changed due to the 
crisis. Tables 2a and 2b show that the demand for real estate has strongly increased. Itis also 
the case at a weaker extent for fixed income products. At the same time, the demand 
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regarding equities, commodities and structured products has declined. For other type of 
assets, the results are either, rather mixed or testify of no major change due to the crisis. 
 
This broad picture deserves to be qualified using the by country and by type of customers’ 
analysis. It appears that the response to the crisis regarding the change in asset allocation is 
different when the countries are considered (table 2a) as well as the type of costumers (table 
2b). While no change has been declared in Germany regarding equities (average close to 3), a 
statistically significant drop at the 10% level is observed in France. The slight decreases 
observed in Belgium and Luxembourg is not statistically significant. This result seems 
principally driven by the behaviour of retail investors (see table 2b) who have strongly 
diminished their position in this asset class with respect to those of high net worth individuals. 
At the same time, the behaviour of costumers in the 4 countries with respect to cash deposits 
has been strongly different. While it has strongly decreased in Belgium and France, it has 
strongly increased in Germany and Luxembourg. Moreover, the life insurance demand has 
slightly increased for retail investors but has not changed for high net worth individuals.  
 
Considering the changes in customers’ demand in a qualitative way, we can point out that 
globally customers ask for more secure assets. This is the reason for the decrease in structured 
products investments as well as equities. If they are still investing in equity markets they are 
tended to choose very carefully assets and markets (DAX, for instance). Another main point 
that we notice in this survey is that the majority of the customers would like to protect their 
capital from market volatility and the lack of transparency of prices (due to the crisis). In fact, 
they are also willing to accept lower interest rates (we will discuss this in details later) and 
take short term positions. They also prefer investing in products “easily understandable” and 
presenting a lower risk profile, (according to interviewees, clients often link lower risk profile 
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with short assets duration close to 18 months in average), typically real estate and 
commodities. A minor part of investors even wants physical commodities in their portfolios, 
this phenomenon being in line with the idea that investors want tangible (palpable) assets. 
Even if in our interviews gold is the most cited product, it does not mean that is the only type 
of commodities customers wish to invest in, but only the easiest example interviewees could 
give.  
 
The period between 2008 and 2012 can be split into 3 periods. Starting from 2008-2011 
customers wanted to protect themselves from uncertainty, volatility and risk by increasing 
their positions in liquid assets (Cash Deposits, Money Markets) and Government Bonds. 
 
The switch occurs in 2011 with the sovereign debt crisis, as the insecurity about Southern 
European countries decreased, French and German decreased. HNWI started to look at best 
returns in Corporate Bonds and Foreign Europe Government Bonds. Germany need to be 
considered as a special case German interviewees reported that the trust and the demand for 
German Bonds remained stable. 
 
We compare these results with those stemming from the analysis of time-series data. We test 
the time-homogeneity of the net flow for three types of securities held by households (cash 
deposits, money market securities, bonds and stocks) in Belgium, France and Germany. We 
also examine the net sales of mutual funds shares for the same asset classes domiciled in 
France and marketed in Germany2. It allows us to contrast the results obtained from 
questionnaires. 
 
                                                
2
	Most	German	promoters	domicile	their	funds	in	Luxembourg	for	tax	purposes,	to	then	are	marketed	back	in	
Germany.	
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Regarding the flow of short and long term cash deposits held by households, the results are 
consistent with those from the questionnaires for Belgium and France, and somehow 
contradict those got for Germany. Belgian, French and German households’ display a similar 
behaviour regarding the flow of their deposits (see table 2c). No major changes occur over the 
period from 2004-Q2 and 2012-Q2. German households even had a strong positive peak 
during the last quarter of 2008. The flow of cash deposits exhibits a positive average over the 
period for the 3 countries considered with comparable volatility3. French and German data are 
strongly correlated and the correlation is weaker with Belgium. No structural change was 
detected in any of these three countries. 
 
Concerning the flow of money market securities held by households, while questionnaires’ 
results display a positive change in the demand for such securities only in Belgium and 
Germany with figures mainly driven by retail investors (see tables 2a and 2b), we observe a 
pattern which somehow confirms this: in average over the 2004Q2-2008Q2, the figures are 
slightly negative in Belgium and France and only marginally positive in Germany. The 
appetite for money market securities by Belgian households experienced a large temporary 
drop concentrated in 20094, whereas this effect seems to be more permanent in France and 
occurs earlier: the Pettitt’s test detects a structural break by the end of 2008 (see table 2d). 
The German demand for such securities experienced a large volatility in 2008. Overall the 
correlation is low and even negative when Belgium and Germany are considered. 
 
This is also confirmed when we look at the aggregate data on the net sales of money market 
mutual funds share. We observe negative figures in average for France and Germany. French 
data display a strong decline from mid-2009 (see table 2e). This effect seems to be more 
                                                
3
	The	high	figure	for	Germany	is	only	driven	by	the	peak	observed	in	the	last	quarter	of	2008.	
4
	If	we	drop	the	data	for	the	first	two	quarters	of	2009,	the	Pettit’s	test	rejects	the	change	of	structure	
observed	in	the	whole	sample	from	2009.	
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permanent than that observed in Germany where they recover neutral values (around zero) 
from 2009. The net sales of money market funds experienced a sharp temporary drop in 
Germany during the crisis (from mid-2008 to late 2009). They are also extremely volatile in 
France compared to Germany. A structural break in the net sales of money market funds is 
observed in France from July 2009 where its mean becomes strongly negative (from 5.852 
billion Euros to -11.208 billion Euros). In Germany, a structural change is also observed but 
earlier (mid-2008). But it appears very temporary since the break seems to be mainly driven 
by the figure of the last quarter of 2008 (a drop of more 20 billion Euros during this quarter). 
 
Regarding bond securities directly held by households, the figures shed light on another 
pictures from that of the questionnaires. While questionnaires exhibit an increasing demand 
due to the crisis for all countries, no similarities are found in the flows of bond holdings by 
households (see table 2f). No major change has occurred in France despite the crisis. The flow 
of households’ bond holdings is also very volatile for each of the three countries considered. 
Its average value is negative only in Belgium. The negative correlation (not statistically 
significant from zero) found shows no similarities among the 3 countries under consideration. 
Whereas we can observe a structural change in the flow of Bond holdings by Belgian 
households from an average of -3,436 million Euros before June 2007 to a positive value of 
more than 733 million Euros thereafter, a structural drop is detected in Germany from the last 
quarter of 2007: the average flow of bond holdings sharply decreased, passing from 8,000 
million Euros to -3,228 thereafter. This result is mainly driven by the last quarter of 2008 
which exhibits a drop of more than 22 billion Euros in Bond holdings. Nevertheless, the 
figures remain slightly negative in average since then. The results obtained when looking at 
the aggregate data on the net sales of bond funds domiciled in France and marketed in 
Germany do not display any similarities in their temporal structure. The crisis has had a very 
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temporary effect concentrated around the year 2008 with a large drop of the net sales in 
Germany, which drives the structural break detected in the statistical analysis5. While they are 
still positive in average for funds marketed in Germany, they appear to be negative in France 
with a slight structural drop detected at the 10% risk level from mid-2007. 
 
Contrary to the questionnaires data wherein we observe a negative pattern for equity in 
Belgium and France6, the flow of equity holdings by households does not seem to have been 
influenced by the crisis in any of the 3 countries under consideration. Its average is even 
positive in each of the 3 countries even if it appears strongly volatile in Belgium (see table 
2h). No temporal similarity between the 3 countries is detected in the data. From the last 
quarter of 2008, a positive structural change is observed in France where the average flow 
goes from 1,425 million Euros to 3,928 million since then. At the 10% risk level, we observe 
a similar pattern in Germany but much earlier, since the break is detected from the second 
quarter of 2007: the average flow jumps from 1,018 million Euros to 3,486 million Euros. 
Therefore, the crisis does not seem to have influenced the direct equity holdings of 
households. Actually, this result should be interpreted with cautiousness, since the net sales of 
equity funds have strongly declined with the crisis as soon as the third quarter of 2007 (see 
table 2i and figure 2) from 8,183 million Euros to -3,476 million Euros in average. When the 
net sales of equity funds marketed in Germany are considered, no structural change seems to 
have occurred despite the crisis even if a little drop is observed around the year 2008. 
 
 
 
                                                
5
	This	break	disappears	if	we	skip	the	data	of	the	year	2008.	
6
	No	major	change	is	observed	in	Germany	(see	table	2a).	
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7. Changes in customers’ expectations towards their financial 
intermediaries 
 
The firm reputation has become an important criterion of choice after the crisis whatever the 
country or the type of investors considered (see table 3a). The performance monitoring is not 
considered as an important criterion by investors, either before or after the crisis. This 
criterion is even weaker after the crisis whatever the country or the type of costumer 
considered (see table 3b).  
 
The quality of client services (see table 3c) correspond to an important criterion for customers 
excepted for Germans before the crisis as the non-parametric tests show it. It has not changed 
with the crisis, excepted for Germans who from now on consider this as a relatively important 
criterion. We can also note that this criterion was more important for high net worth clients 
than for retail ones before the crisis; the opposite occurs after the crisis.  
 
Whatever the country or the type of investors, the transparency about fees and products has 
become an important criterion after the crisis while it was neglected before (see table 3d).  
 
While globally, the investment strategy is not considered as a very important criterion of 
choice either before or after the crisis, it appears significant for Germans after the crisis (see 
table 3e). Moreover, high net worth clients paid more attention to this criterion than retail 
costumers before the crisis.  
 
The number of products available was a relatively weak criterion before the crisis. It has 
become even weaker after it (see table 3f). 
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The asset allocation decisions are considered as a very feeble criterion of choice. It has not 
changed with the crisis (see table 3g)  
 
The actual performance of the fund was a key indicator for retail investors (vs. HNWIs) 
before the crisis. It has become much less important compared to the others after the crisis 
and, from now on, both types of investors share the same relative disinterest towards this 
criterion (see table 3h). 
 
Regarding the qualitative answers provided by interviewees, the financial crisis conducted to 
a global lack of trust of customers regarding financial institutions. In order to restore the 
reputation, they may have lost and simply for responding to this lack of trust, bankers have to 
undertake profound changes. They do it quantitatively, by adapting their prices and products 
and qualitatively by adapting their services panel. The most cited way to increase clients’ 
confidence in a financial institution is to increase transparency. If customers trusted bankers 
before the crisis by favouring returns, they are now looking for more information about fees 
and rebates for instance. Customers also widely use internet and newspapers to get the 
information they require. So, bankers face a double issue. They need to provide strong 
information to respond to the lack of trust, to mandatory obligations and to avoid the “Russian 
dolls” effect. But they have clients for whom financial rules and pricing models may be 
difficult to understand. Increasing transparency is also a way to differ from other competitors 
when the cost reduction is not possible anymore. Giving information about “how these costs 
are made of” and also why it “cannot be made for free” can legitimize these costs. One 
solution to solve the gap between information accuracy, customers’ expectations and 
simplicity, could be to limit the access to “simple and understandable products” depending on 
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the customers’ profiles, “spending more time with customers” to explain those fees, return 
and funds access conditions. 
 
Interviewees also provided answers about the need of more advising. Since the crisis, clients 
switch banks easily. As most financial institutions propose the same investment types to 
customers, they differ in advising to keep clients. It also increases clients’ fidelity and trust. 
Customers’ expectations, products complexity and tax regimes take different shapes (this last 
one only concern France in interviewees’ answers). Customers think more in term of trust 
than in terms of products, but at the same time, the products complexity and tax regimes 
increase. Advisors need to propose specific products to their customers’ profiles with 
powerful economic analysis giving them trends and warnings about possible issues on assets 
(the Greek bonds crack was mentioned). Customers ask for more convenience. They want to 
deal with only one advisor, highly available, who keeps things simple, and guide them with a 
language they understand. 
 
As we have shown above, price transparency is quite new in financial industry. This 
transparency, as well as the low performance of some asset classes (money markets, UCITS, 
cash deposits, life insurance) with low returns, encourages clients to ask for fees reductions. 
The fact that an increasing part of clients have multiple accounts in multiple institutions 
increases this phenomenon. The increasing competition between traditional companies and 
online companies with lower fees pushes prices down.  
 
Incorporating online services into financial offers is a cross sectional aspect. It impacts 
transparency as customers can get direct and precise information about markets and pricing 
rules. It affects advising with the increasing use of smartphones with embedded video chat 
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compatibility and with the capability to give personalized information about markets and 
products in relation to their actual portfolio and investment profile with a suitable cost for the 
financial institution. The generational gap observed few years earlier between the connected 
generation and the others is going to disappear with the use of smartphones. So, we would 
like to add that creating new online services is now one of the financial institutions priorities. 
It could be a response to the lack of time of customers who face a relative traditional industry 
in which branches still play the contact role. 
 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
Using qualitative and quantitative data from questionnaires submitted to financial 
intermediaries, we investigate the changes in individual investors’ behavior, regarding their 
risk aversion, their investment policies and their expectations about their financial institutions.  
We have found that the change in investors’ risk aversion depends on the type of investors, 
affecting more retail than HNWI. This is illustrated by the asset allocation of different types 
of investors, retail investors increasing their positions in less risky assets such as life 
insurance. Our qualitative findings are not fully in line with this result. This may be due to the 
limit of our questionnaire study, based on asset managers’ answers rather than investors’ 
ones. However this technique enables us to analyses a wider panel of investors. However, 
both types of investors have changed their investment policies, accepting lower returns and 
seeking for greater liquidity in order to take shorter positions. We also noticed a hard change 
in the expectations investors have regarding their financial intermediaries, looking for more 
transparency, more services and a greater reputation. 
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Figure 4 
Demographic Statistics about questionnaire sample 
 
  
Number % 
Country Belgium 6 18,18% 
  France 7 21,21% 
  Luxembourg 6 42,42% 
  Germany 14 18,18% 
Gender Male 27 81,82% 
  Female 6 18,18% 
Age Under 25 0 0,00% 
  25-35 3 9,09% 
  36-45 15 45,45% 
  46-55 14 42,42% 
  56 and more 1 3,03% 
Experience Less than 5 years 5 15,15% 
  5 to 9 years 4 12,12% 
  10 to 14 years 7 21,21% 
  
More than 15 
years 17 51,52% 
Business 
Divisions Retail Banking 12 36,36% 
  Private Banking 20 60,61% 
  
Asset 
Management 2 6,06% 
  Insurrance 2 6,06% 
Types of clients Retail 11 33,33% 
  HNWI 22 66,67% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 
Qualitative general model 
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Figure 6 
Qualitative model based on questionnaires answers 
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Chapter 3: Physiological Test on Beliefs 
Formation 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this paper we test the beliefs formation in line with the Brunnermeier and Parker model 
(2005). Our experimental setup allows us to test their anticipatory emotions about future 
outcomes as well as their preference for Skewness. We use a two similar lotteries setup, 
except for Skewness. We show that participants who play with the non-skewed lottery elicit 
greater self-regulation than the other participants one minute before learning the lottery 
results, they best regulate their emotions one minute before learning their outcomes. 
Considering all participants, we find that participants form anticipatory pleasure about their 
future earnings only two minutes after knowing in which lottery they will play and that 
anticipatory emotion is stable. Like in the Brunnermeier and Parker framework participants 
form an anticipatory emotion about the future payoffs of the lotteries that makes them better 
off. Our results suggest that the anticipations formed by our subjects are as strong as the 
emotions they feel when they learn the lottery results. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Anticipations and feelings have been widely studied in Neuroscience. The topic is younger in 
Finance but is now widely investigated, particularly the link between anticipation and the 
possibility of bad outcomes. Some papers support anticipations theoretically, others 
experimentally but from our knowledge none in Finance investigate the neurological basis of 
anticipations. But, nowadays neurosciences represent an increasing field in Management 
Science and allow researchers to find the point of origin of a lot of biases or behaviours they 
investigated traditionally so far. 
 
In this study we show that all participants form anticipatory feelings about their future 
lotteries outcomes. Subjects who take part in the non-skewed lottery form as much 
anticipatory emotions as those playing with the skewed lottery, however, they exhibit greater 
self-regulation one minute before learning the lottery results.  
 
Several theoretical papers have investigated anticipations in financial markets. Brunnermeier 
and Parker (2005) study a model where agents are forward looking, believing that their 
investment will pay well makes them happier. This behaviour generates a first order gain with 
an increase in anticipatory utility and a second order loss because of the biased behaviour. Put 
another way, agents’ beliefs have an instantaneous impact on their well-being via anticipatory 
emotions about their future utility flows. It influences their investment decision, by 
encouraging them to prefer skewed assets, which can lower their incomes. The authors also 
show (2007) that as the cost of biased beliefs are second order, investors hold biased 
judgments about probabilities. Hence, they do not diversify their portfolios properly and 
preferred skewed assets. The increase in demand for skewed assets can lower their returns. 
Brunnermeier et al. (2008) also test optimistic belief with planning fallacy framework. 
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Similarly, optimistic beliefs have been investigated experimentally as well. Mayraz (2011) 
conducts an experiment to test biased optimism. In this experiment, subjects are farmers 
(sellers) or bakers (buyers). Participants are shown a chart representing the evolution of wheat 
prices over a period of time and then asked to predict the future price at a certain future date. 
Hence, they are like speculators who ignore fundamental value of wheat and only predict 
future values based on historical data standardized from date 0 to 99. The task is to predict the 
value at time 100. Subjects receive a participation fee as well as the value of their sales and an 
accuracy bonus. According to the optimism bias, farmers should predict higher prices than 
bakers. This prediction is confirmed with his data, more than 60% of farmers are above 
median and 62% of bakers below. Another prediction is that the optimism bias decreases as 
the cost of holding this biased belief increases.  Hence, the greater the optimism, the lower 
should be the accuracy bonus. This prediction is not confirmed by the experiment results; the 
author finds that the bias is an increasing function of the accuracy bonus. He also shows a 
positive correlation between bias and confidence. 
 
This optimism bias, or optimism belief, finds robustness with diseases testing. Oster et al. 
(2011) investigate the relation between optimistic beliefs and Huntington disease (HD) 
testing. They use a dataset of people at risk with the disease. These patients reported the 
subjective probability of having the disease. Among people with minor signs of having HD 
the probability reported was 40%. Over those with more signs of HD, the probability 
increases to 50%. In another study, Sieff and Loewenstein (1999) test peoples’ reactions when 
learning results from HIV test. In this experiment, subjects are asked to predict their reaction 
to HIV test results 5 weeks after learning the results. They also asked subjects to estimate the 
likelihood that the test would be positive. Overall people who learnt that they were positive to 
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HIV experienced more distress than those with a negative one. However, when comparing the 
anticipative response and the post result response from the newspaper subjects, they find that 
the anticipatory distress was higher than the actual distress. This pattern was the same with 
negative results. 
 
These two papers refer to bad anticipation. But, people also tend to delay future possible good 
outcomes in contradiction with discounted utility theory which predicts that people prefer to 
consume their desired outcomes as soon as they can. Indeed, Loewenstein (1987) conducted a 
survey based experiment where he asks participants the amount of money they are willing to 
pay for different possible outcomes in different periods of time. The different items proposed 
were to obtain four dollars, to avoid losing four dollars, to avoid losing 1,000 dollars, to get a 
kiss from their favourite movie star and to avoid receiving a non-lethal electric shock. The 
time delay proposed were immediately, 3 hours later, 24 hours later, 3 days, 1 year and 10 
years. Both the movie star kiss and the shock follow strange patterns. People are more willing 
to pay to receive the kiss in 3 days rather than immediately, this delay allow them to form 
anticipation regarding the kiss they would receive. Likewise, they are willing to pay more to 
delay the electric shock in 10 years than now. 
 
To elicit the investors affective approach, Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001) use the same movie 
star and shocks items to investigate people preferences. In a survey based experiment they 
asked their subject to respond their preferences about receiving 50 dollars for sure and being 
kissed by their favourite movie star for sure. In another condition they were asked in which of 
the following lotteries they would prefer to participate: 1% of chance of receiving a kiss from 
their favourite movie star and another lottery offering 1% of chance to receive 50 dollars in 
cash. In the certainty condition, more than 60% of participants prefer the cash reward. But, in 
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the uncertain condition about 70% of participants prefer to participate in the lottery allowing 
to receive the movie star kiss. In another experiment, they told half their subjects that they 
would receive an electric shock and to the other half that they would lose 20 dollars. For each 
of the two conditions, participants need to imagine how much they would pay to avoid these 
bad outcomes relative to the following probabilities: 1% of chance that the bad outcome 
occurs, 99% of chance, occurs for sure. In the certainty condition the median price to avoid 
the shock was 20 dollars. In the 1% condition, the median price was 7 dollars, greater than the 
median price to avoid losing 20 dollars (only 1 dollar). This result shows that for subjects, the 
certainty of receiving a shock for sure is less stressful or aversive than 1% of chance to 
receive a shock. The authors find that subjects value more low probabilities for affect-rich 
outcomes (electric shock) and less for affect-poor outcomes (losing 20 dollars). Alternatively, 
the median price to avoid 99% of chance to receive an electric shock was lower than the 
median price to avoid losing 20 dollars with the same probability, meaning that subjects 
underweight large probabilities for affect rich outcomes. They find the same results with 
positive affect-rich and affect-poor outcomes (affect-poor: 500 dollars in coupons for courses 
/ affect-rich: 500 dollars to travel to Paris). Overweighting small probabilities of affect-rich 
outcomes seems to be linked with hope or scare. 
 
On the other hand, Neuroscience experiments have shown that regarding bad possible and 
affect-rich outcomes, probabilities do not matter. Monat et al. (1972) conducted two 
experiments measuring heart rate and skin conductivity on subjects. Their experiments consist 
in receiving electric shocks under a temporal uncertainty where the subject knows that he 
would receive an electric shock but ignore when, and an event uncertainty where the 
participant knows when but not if the shock would occur. Under the temporal condition, 
subjects formed anticipatory stress in the beginning of the measuring and less as time passed. 
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In the event uncertainty, results are inverse. Indeed, when subjects know the precise timing of 
the shock their attention increases toward the upcoming event, increasing their arousal. 
 
This last result suggest that fear seems to increase as the upcoming bad event approaches. 
Breznitz (1971) makes an experiment where he tells participants they would receive an 
electric shock in either 3, 6 or 12 minutes. His results show that the mean heart rate was 
higher for participants in the 3 or 6-minutes treatments without statistical differences and 
much lower in the 12-minutes condition. 
 
Other research has found positive correlation between anxiety and outcome predictions. 
Shepperd et al. (2005) show that anxiety contribute to lower predictions about future events. 
 
In this paper we use two lotteries with the same characteristics except in terms of Skewness 
and take heart rate measures to investigate the beliefs formation and anticipation made by 
subjects between the lottery announcement and the moment when they watch the result.  
 
We want to demonstrate that subjects who participate in the positively skewed lottery elicit 
more anticipatory pleasure than subjects participating in the 0 skewed lottery. We investigate 
the evolution over time of this anticipation, and its robustness compared with feelings 
experienced after the earnings announcements. 
 
 We show that participants who play the non-skewed lottery exhibit greater self-regulation 
than subjects taking part in the positively skewed one from the last minute of the waiting 
interval. In terms of mean heart rate and mean beat to beat intervals, this anticipation is stable 
until they watch the drawing without differences among lotteries. However, this anticipation 
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only starts the second minute after watching the lottery announcement. In addition, the 
emotion felt by subjects after learning the results is less persistent than the anticipation 
formed earlier. When considering standard deviations of heart rate and beat to beat intervals 
the anticipation is formed the first minute after watching the lottery in which subjects will 
play and vanishes one minute after.  
 
We also highlight that, considering mean heart rate, mean beat to beat intervals, and standard 
deviations, this anticipation of pleasure is as strong as the happiness participants feel when 
watching their earnings whatever the physiological measure taken. 
 
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we discuss our experimental design including 
our sample, the physiological measures and the statistic test we will use. In section 3 we 
present our results about our significant variables. In section 4 we discuss and interpret our 
results. Section 5 elicits the limitations of our study and open a way to further research. We 
conclude in section 6.  
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2.  Experimental design and procedure 
2.1. Subjects 
 
A total of 43 students from Toulouse Business School (Toulouse, France) in their last years in 
Master participated in the experiment. We exclude 5 subjects in our analysis because of bad 
measurements. Details on our sample are presented in Table 1. 
 
	 Treatment	1	 Treatment	2	 Whole	sample	
Age	 24.39	 24.4	 24.39	
Male	 13	 14	 27	
Female	 5	 6	 11	
 
 
 
2.2. Experimental procedure 
 
We propose to our subjects to participate in a lottery to earn bonus points for their module in 
Finance. Two lotteries are available, one with a Skewness equal to 0 (lottery 1) and another 
with a positive Skewness of 2,65 (lottery 2). Both have equal means and standard deviations. 
Details of the two lotteries are presented in Table 2. Each subject only participates in one 
lottery, once. Lottery 1 refers to treatment 1 and lottery 2 to treatment 2. 
 
 
 
Table 1 Subjects used for the experiment 
Lottery	1	 Lottery	2	
Probability	 Bonus	points	 Probability	 Bonus	points	
0,01	 1.5	 0.01	 4.25	
0,49	 1.5	 0.49	 1.35	
0,50	 0.5	 0.50	 0.59	
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	 Lottery	1	 Lottery	2	
Expected	Bonus	 0.1	 0.1	
Variance	 0.25%	 0.25%	
Standard	deviation	 0.05	 0.05	
Skewness	 0	 2.645	
 
 
 
Before the experiment starts, each subject receives the rules of the game written in English 
and French, depending on the subject’s preferences (see appendix 1). Once the rules read, the 
subject can ask the experimenter any further explanations about the procedure of the 
experiment. Then the experimenter shows the way to paste electrodes for ECG properly and 
records age and gender of the subject. 
 
The experiment takes place as follows. Once the subject has paced the electrodes and has 
asked all remaining questions, the experimenter starts taking ECG measures until the end of 
the experiment. The experiment has three periods during which the subject has to stay as 
motionless as he can. During all periods the experimenter tells the subject the remaining time 
(3 minutes, 2 minutes, 1 minutes 30 seconds, 30 seconds). At the end of the first period the 
experimenter draws the lottery in which the subject will play in front of him (lottery 1 or 
lottery 2). Then the second waiting period of 4 minutes starts. At the end of this period the 
experimenter draws the results of the lottery in front of the subject and shows him the results. 
Then the third waiting period of 4 minutes starts. At the end of this period the subject can put 
the electrodes off and asks the experimenter any questions he wants. 
Table 2 Details of the lotteries presented to subjects 
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Figure 7. Experiment timeline 
 
 
2.3. Physiological measures and statistical methods 
 
Heart rate was recorded with Biograph EKG Pro/Flex and Procomp 2 with three electrodes 
paced on the chest of each subject. Heart rate was recorded continuously for each subject with 
a heart rate sampling of 2048Hz and time separations between time intervals were computed 
manually during each replication. Mean heart rate and heart rate variability (HRV) were 
computed via Kubios HRV 2.1 with automatic artefact correction set to very low. 
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2.4. Selection of time intervals 
 
Each original time interval has been divided in 1 minute intervals to enable proper measures 
comparisons. Indeed, for HRV measurements (heart-rate variability), the variance increases 
with the length of the interval, the longer the interval, the higher the HRV (Task Force of The 
European Society of Cardiology and The North American Society of Pacing and 
Electrophysiology, 1996). 
 
Hence, we select the last minute of the first waiting period as a baseline that we compare with 
all periods after. This period will be named “variablename_0” in all tables. We take period 4 
as baseline to avoid any contradictory measures linked with the experiment itself. Indeed, no 
participant took part in a Neurofinance experiment before and they were not comfortable (that 
may induce higher heart rate) with electrodes on their chests during the first minutes. 
Hence, the fourth minute of the first waiting is referred as the baseline period, periods 1, 2, 3, 
4 are in the interval between the drawing of the lottery and the drawing of the results and 
periods 5, 6, 7, 8 are in the interval after the drawing of the results. Variables are named 
“variablename_periodnumber” in all tables. 
 
 
2.5. Physiological variables 
 
We present in Figure 1 the list of all variables obtained with Kubios HRV. 
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Figure 8. List of all parameters obtained with Kubios HRV software with their definitions and units. Source Tarvainen et al. 
(2013) 
 
However, in the present study we only use mean heart rate (mean HR), standard deviation of 
heart rate (SDHR), mean inter beat intervals (mean RR), and the standard deviation of beat to 
beat intervals (SDNN) for the time-domain analysis. In addition, we use low frequency power 
in Fast Fourier Transform spectrum (FFT) in absolute and in average power (lowpowfft, 
lowpowprfft), the total power of all frequencies in FFT spectrum (totpowfft), the ratio of low 
frequencies over high frequencies for the frequency-domain analysis as well as a surrogate of 
the LF/HF ratio we will discuss. Our 1-minute time intervals do not allow us to use very low 
frequencies in our study (The European Society of Cardiology and The North American 
Society of Pacing and Electrophysiology 1996). 
 
SDNN represents the total power of heart rate variability in the time domain, total power in 
all frequencies represent the same in the frequency domain. LF bands are in the range from 
.004Hz to .15Hz and are associated both with parasympathetic and sympathetic activation. HF 
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bands are in the .15 to .4Hz range. An increase in LF is correlated with an activation of the 
parasympathetic system responsible of positive arousal (see Kreibig 2010 for a survey about 
emotions and heart rate measures). 
 
The Task Force of the European Society of Cardiology and The North American Society of 
Pacing and Electrophysiology (1996) recommends 24h intervals and 5-minutes intervals for 
long-term and short-term HRV analysis. However, several papers investigating the feasibility 
of taking shorter intervals demonstrate good correlations for heart rate measures (mean RR 
and SDHR) and some HRV parameters as SDNN, RMSSD and LF/HF (Nussinovitch et al. 
2011) in healthy people in resting condition. In our study we do not obtain significant results 
with LF/HF. Hence we compute SDNN/RMSSD ratio as a surrogate. 
 
 
2.6. Statistical analysis 
 
Statistical analysis was performed with SPSS 23. Data were tested for normal distribution 
with Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test. As all variables are not normally distributed non-parametric 
tests are used for the analysis. Comparisons within groups are made with Friedman Test for 
two or more groups and with Dunn Test with Bonferroni correction for two groups. 
Comparisons between groups are made with Mann-Whitney U-Test. A p-value ≤ 0,05 is 
considered significant. Some exceptions are made with p-values under .10. 
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3. Results 
3.1. Differences between samples 
 
To test whereas a difference exists between our two samples (treatment 1 and treatment 2) we 
run a Mann-Whitney U-Test for all our variables (see Table 4 for the list of our variables). No 
statistical differences exist between the two samples (p-value > 0,05) except for sdhr_4 (U = 
104, p = .026), lfpowfft_2 (U = 108, p = .035), lfpowprfft_3 (U = 106, p = .030) and 
totpowfft_4 (U = 107, p = .033). 
 
We present in Table 3 statistics for each variable. SDHR in period 4 (+1,488), power of low 
frequencies in period 4 (+1 672,749ms²), power of low frequencies in period 3 (+13.094%) 
and total power of all frequencies in period 4 (+2 451,019ms²) are significantly higher in 
treatment 1 (0 skewed lottery) compared with treatment 2 (Skewed lottery). 
 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics for SDHR, and frequencies power between the two samples 
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Regarding the power in the LF band in ms² (lofpowfft_periodnumber) we run a Friedman 
Test to detect differences between the waiting periods compared with baseline. The Chi-
square is 12.267 (p = .015). Only period 4 is statistically higher than baseline (Z = -1.667, p = 
.016) with an increase of 921.713ms², whereas we do not see any differences with baseline in 
treatment 2 (Chi square = .880, p = .927). 
 
We have the same results for the total power of all frequencies (Chi-square = 12.489, p = 
.014) where period 4 is significantly higher than baseline in treatment 1 (Z = -1.667, p = .016) 
with a rise of 568.220ms². As for the power of low frequencies, no meaningful difference 
exists between baseline and period 4 (Chi square = 2.680, p = .613). 
 
However, we do not find statistical difference compared with baseline for the average power 
of low frequencies (lfpowprfft) neither in treatment 1 (Chi-square = 2.067, p = .559) nor in 
treatment 2 (Chi square = 5.920, p = .205). 
 
 
3.2. Results considering the whole sample 
 
We are interested in differences in means between our 1-minute baseline period and the four 
periods after the lottery drawing. Then we compare the baseline period with the four periods 
after drawing the results. Finally, we compare differences between the periods after revealing 
the lottery and after drawing the results to subjects. 
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3.2.1. Heart rate (time-domain) 
 
The Friedman Test for the baseline and periods 1, 2, 3 and 4 reports a Chi-square of 26.653 (p 
= .000). We detect differences among our periods. Periods 2 (Z = 1.711, p = .000), 3 (Z = 
1.079, p = .029) and 4 (Z = 1.026, p = .047) are statistically different with baseline with 
respective lowering of -2.948, -1.934 and -2.012. Period 1 is significantly higher than period 2 
(Z = 1.316, p = .003) with a diminution of 1.918 bpm between the two periods. 
 
The Friedman Test between baseline and periods 5 to 8 reports a Chi-square of 21.937 (p = 
.000). Only periods 6 (Z = 1.500, p = .000) and 7 (Z = 1.368, p = .002) are statistically lower 
from baseline respectively about -3.363 and -2.967 bpm, without differences between these 
periods. 
 
There are no differences among periods after the lottery revelation and after the draw of the 
results except for periods 2 (Z = 1.763, p = .048), 6 (Z = -2.316, p = .001) and 7 (Z = -1.921, p 
= .018) with period 1 with respective decrease of -1.918, -2.333 and -1.937 bpm. We present 
in Table 4 the descriptive statistics about heart rate and in Figure 3 the evolution of heart rate 
across periods compared with the baseline period. 
 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics for mean heart rate 
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Figure 9. Mean heart rate compared with baseline. Periods in red are different from baseline (p < .05) 
 
The Friedman Test for the standard deviation of heart rate reports a Chi-square of 16.253 (p = 
.003). Only period 1 is significantly different from baseline (Z = -1.158, p = .008) with an 
increase of 1.485 bpm. Other differences are among periods 2 (Z = 1.158, p = .014), 3 (Z = 
1.211, p = .008) and 4 (Z = 1.079, p = .029) with period 1. SDHR decreases for -1.252 from 
period 1 to 2 as well as from period 1 to period 4. However, it increases for 6.977 bpm 
between period 1 and period 3.  
 
Results are similar regarding the differences between baseline and the periods relative to the 
results drawing (Chi-square of 21.263, p = .000). Only period 5 is statistically different from 
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baseline (Z = -1.395, p = .001) with a rise about 1.433 bpm. Other differences are among 
periods 6 (Z = 1.342, p = .002), 7 (Z = 1.289, p = .004) and 8 (Z = 1.237, p = .007) with period 
5 with respective attenuations of -1.170, -1.072 and -1.191.  
 
No statistical difference exists between periods 1 and 5 (p = .712), but periods 3 and 5 are 
different (Z = 2.105, p = .005) with an increase of 1.263 bpm between the two periods. At a 
10% level, we notice a difference between periods 1 and 8 (Z = -1.737, p = .056) and between 
periods 4 and 5 (Z = 1.711, p = .065). We present descriptive statistics about SDHR in Table 
5 and the evolution of SDHR across periods compared with baseline in Figure 4. 
 
 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics about standard deviation of heart rate 
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Figure 10. Standard deviation of heart rate compared with baseline. Periods in red are different from baseline (p < .05) 
 
 
3.2.2. Heart rate variability (time domain) 
 
We use mean beat to beat interval (mean RR) and the standard deviation of beat to beat 
interval (SDNN) for the time domain analysis of heart rate variability (HRV). 
 
The Friedman Test for mean RR between baseline and periods 1, 2, 3 and 4 gives a Chi-
square of 21.874 (p = .000). The only difference in mean detected at a 5% level is amongst 
baseline and period 2 (Z = -1.605, p = .000) with an increase of the beat to beat interval of 
23.694ms. Baseline and period 4 are also statistically different, but only at a 10 % level (Z = -
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1.132, p = .058) with an increase between the two periods of 17.528ms. The mean RR rises 
about 14.469ms between periods 1 and 2 (Z = -1.132, p = .018). 
 
Results are quite similar regarding the differences between baseline and periods 5, 6 and 7 
with a Chi-square of 23.621 (p = .000). At a 5% level, periods 6 (Z = -1.553, p = .000) and 7 
(Z = -1.421, p = .001) are different from baseline with respective rises of 28.921 and 
24.414ms. 
 
Regarding differences in mean RR between the lottery revelation interval and the results 
drawing (Chi-square = 22.930, p = .002), we notice differences between periods 6 (Z = -
2.132, p = .004) and 7 (Z = -1.842, p = .029) with period 1 at a 5% level, with growths of 
19.696 and 15.189ms. At a 10% level, period 6 is significantly higher than period 3 with an 
increase of 15.361ms (Z = -1.658, p = .089). We present descriptive statistics about mean RR 
in Table 6 and its evolution across periods compared with baseline in Figure 5. 
 
 
Table 6. Descriptive statistics about mean beat to beat interval 
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Figure 11. Mean beat to beat interval compared with baseline. Periods in red are different from baseline (p ≤ .10) 
 
 
Our results about standard deviation of beat to beat interval (SDNN) are in line with those 
from SDHR. The Friedman Test Chi-square gives a value of 12.547 (p = .014) from baseline 
to period 4. Only period 1 is different from baseline (Z = -1.158, p = .014) with an increase of 
10.440ms. Period 3 is significantly lower than period 1 (Z = 1.026, p = .047) with a 
diminution of -7.895ms. 
 
We obtain similar results regarding baseline and periods 5 to 8 with a Chi-square of 22.968 (p 
= .000). Only period 5 is superior to baseline (Z = 1.684, p = .000) with a growth of 
69.956ms. Other differences are between periods 6 (Z = 1.158, p = .014), 7 (Z = 1.026, p = 
.047) and 8 (Z = 1.132, p = .018) with respective decline of -12.900, -10.612 and -12.898ms. 
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Across waiting intervals, the Chi-square for the Friedman Test is 25.860 (p = .001). At a 5% 
level, period 5 is significantly higher than period 3 (Z = -2.158, p = .003) by 12.875ms as well 
as periods 6 and 8. At a 10% level, period 5 is significantly higher than period 2 about 
4.980ms (Z = -1.711, p = .065). We present in Table 7 descriptive statistics about SDNN as 
well as its evolution across periods compared with baseline in Figure 6. 
 
 
Table 7. Descriptive statistics about standard deviation of beat to beat interval 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Standard deviation of beat to beat interval compared with baseline. Periods in red are different from baseline (p 
< .05) 
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3.2.3. Heart rate variability (frequency domain) 
 
Considering the total power in ms² of all frequencies we do not detect any differences 
between baseline and periods 1, 2, 3 and 4 with a Chi-square of 7.095 (p = .131) for the 
Friedman Test. However, baseline and periods 5, 6, 7 and 8 differ significantly (Chi-square = 
15.432, p = .004). Only period 5 differs significantly from baseline (Z = -1.237, p = .007) with 
an increase about 1130.607ms². 
 
Baseline apart, we notice differences between period 2 (Z = 2.132, p = .004) and 3 (Z = 2.132, 
p = .004) and period 5 with respective increases of 1302.184 and 1727,154ms². We also 
notice a decrease between period 5 and 7 of 1345.869ms² at a 10% level (Z = 1.711, p = .065). 
We present descriptive statistics about the total power of all frequencies in Table 8 as well as 
its evolution across periods in Figure 7. 
 
Table 8. Descriptive statistics about the total power of all frequencies in ms² 
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Figure 13. Total power of all frequencies in FFT spectrum compared with baseline. Period in red is different from baseline 
(p < .05) 
 
We do not find any statistical difference across periods regarding LF/HF ratio with a Chi-
square of 12.302 (p = .138) for the Friedman Test. Hence, we decide to test a surrogate for 
this ratio (Wang & Huang, 2012): SDNN/RMSSD. Regarding the difference between baseline 
and the lottery revelation interval (Chi-square = 18.211, p = .001), only period 1 is 
significantly higher (Z = -1.289, p = .004) with a rise of .315. Other differences are among 
periods 2 (Z = 1.342, p = .002) and 4 (Z = 1.105, p = .023) with period 1 with respective drops 
of -.291 and -.280. 
 
Considering changes in SDNN over RMSSD between baseline and the results interval (Chi-
square of 20.821, p = .000), only period 5 is positively different from baseline (Z = -1.184, p 
= .011) with an increase of .244. Other differences are amongst periods 6 (Z = 1.053, p = 
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.037), 7 (Z = 1.237, p = .007) and 8 (Z = 1.526, p = .000) with period 5 with respective drops 
of -.203, -.257 and -.106. 
 
We find no significant difference between period 1 and 5 (Z = -.237, p = .706). We present in 
Table 9 descriptive statistics about SNDD over RMSSD and its evolution across periods in 
Figure 8. 
 
Table 9. Descriptive statistics about SDNN/RMSSD 
 
 
Figure 14. SDNN/RMSS compared with baseline. Periods in red are different from baseline (p < .05) 
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4. Discussion 
 
We investigate the formation of anticipations in subjects when facing lotteries. For that 
purpose, we compare physiological measures across different periods of time. 
 
For all variables, the first period “variablename_0” is considered as a baseline. During this 
interval, participants are in a waiting condition, where they do not form neither beliefs nor 
anticipation. Then subjects are shown a lottery (lottery 1 or lottery 2) and they are free to form 
or not anticipations about their future earnings during the four subsequent minutes. If 
participants form anticipations about their future outcomes, we expect to detect changes, 
positive or negative, during these periods (1, 2, 3 and 4) compared with the baseline period. 
Finally, they are shown the results of the lottery and are free to feel any sentiment about the 
result. If they experience sentiment we expect to measure changes in our physiological 
measures during periods 5, 6, 7 and 8, depending on the subject’s sentiment. 
 
 
4.1. Formation of anticipations 
 
In the previous section we elicit differences between our two samples regarding standard 
deviation of heart rate in period 4, power of low frequencies in period 4, power of low 
frequencies in percentage in period 3 and total power of all frequencies in period 4. In 
particular, we highlight the fact that participants in treatment 1 have significantly higher 
values for all these variables (Table 3), especially regarding values for frequencies in the low 
band. Moreover, only the power of low frequencies (lfpowfft) as well as the total power of all 
frequencies (toppowfft) are significantly different from baseline. Higher LF values indicate 
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better emotion regulation in subjects in treatment 1 compared with those in treatment 2. 
Bradley et al. (2010) have tested the effects of a self-regulation program on students. They 
show that students who have received this program have learned better to regulate their 
emotions. They elicit greater both HF and LF frequency compared to students who have not 
received the program. Emotion regulation is related with emotion suppression and reappraisal 
(which can be interpreted as seeing the bigger picture) as well as better cognitive functioning 
(Gross 2002). Hence, participants in treatment 1 regulate more their anticipations about the 
future outcomes than participants in treatment 2 only from the last minute of the waiting 
period. 
 
From now we will consider the whole sample. Heart rate measures are known to be good 
proxies of happiness and anticipatory pleasure. In our sample we detect significant changes in 
mean heart rate between period 2 and period 6 (Table 4, Figure 3) compared with baseline. 
Our results suggest that participants in the lotteries start making anticipations only from 
period 2, they stay in a pure waiting condition the first minute after learning the lottery they 
participate in. After period 2 mean heart rate is significantly lower than during baseline. The 
research in Neuroscience is mixed about the interpretation of heart rate. Indeed, heart rate 
values need to be interpreted differently regarding the experiment setup, particularly the 
emotion material used. When imagined material is involved, studies report increased heart 
rate and increased respiratory activity (Van Diest et al. 2001). However, when visual material 
is involved such as movies (Codispoti et al. 2008) or pictures (Bernat et al. 2006), a 
decreasing heart rate amongst other factors as skin conductance response is observed. Our 
experiment follows this kind of path as we show participants pictures with the lottery number 
and probabilities. Hence, we interpret the differences in heart rate as a formation of an 
anticipatory pleasure made by subjects about the future payoffs of the lotteries. 
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The heart rate follows the same pattern when participants learn the results. We only observe 
differences between periods 6 and 7 with baseline, indicating that participants feel happiness 
from the second minute after learning the lottery payoffs until the third minute. Several papers 
experiments with visual materials induction report decreased heart rate (Dimberg and 
Thunberg 2007). 
 
Inversely mean beat to beat interval is negatively correlated with heart rate, the higher the 
heart rate, the lower the inter-beat interval. We notice a significant increase in mean RR 
between baseline and periods 2 and 4 (Table 6 and Figure 5). Surprisingly period 3 is not 
significantly different from baseline. Several studies have investigated the link between mean 
beat to beat interval and emotions. In an experiment when emotions are induced with visual 
material, Christie and Friedman (2004) test the implications of different emotions like 
amusement, contentment, anger and fear on different heart rate measures. They find a positive 
correlation between amusement and mean beat to beat interval. Geisler et al. 2010 test the 
hypothesis that a higher HRV is related to a better subjective well-being, as reported by a 
better mood and a higher satisfaction with-life. They demonstrate that HRV is positively 
correlated with positive hedonic tone such as joy and positive tense arousal like calmness. 
 
Regarding the differences in mean between after the draw, only periods 5, 6, and 7 are 
statistically higher than baseline. This result suggests that participants do not feel any kind of 
emotion three minutes after knowing the lottery result. 
 
We obtain another insight when taking into consideration standard deviation of heart rate 
(SDHR) and standard deviation of beat to beat intervals (SDNN). In these two cases we only 
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observe significant rises in periods 1 and 5 only compared with baseline. The changes in 
SDHR (Table 5 and Figure 6) in the first minute after the lottery announcement and after the 
notification of the results suggest a modification in the heart rate one period before what we 
measured with the mean heart rate. 
 
Increased standard deviation of beat intervals is involved positive emotional states (McCraty 
et al. 1998) such joy (Kornreich et al. 1998) and happiness when evocating material is shown 
to subjects (Ritz et al. 2005 and Dimberg & Thunberg, 2007). In the present study SDNN 
significantly rises (Table 7 and Figure 6) in period 1 just after the lottery announcement and is 
significantly lower in periods before and after suggesting a peak of positive feeling after the 
lottery announcement, decreasing in the following periods. The same pattern can be observed 
in period 5. However, this result should be taken with caution as the literature about SDNN 
measures during very-short term intervals is still unclear. 
 
Results on SDNN/RMSSD are mixed. We use this variable as a surrogate of LF/HF which 
represents the balance between the sympathetic system, which prepare the body for 
emergency actions, and parasympathetic system that functions when the body is relaxed. High 
LF and LF/HF ratio is involved in cases of anxiety in correlation with high heart rate and low 
heart rate variability. Murakami & Ohira (2007) research on anxiety have shown one 
exception to this relationship between heart rate and LF/HF ratio. Ritz et al. (2005) illustrate a 
simultaneous parasympathetic system deactivation and sympathetic activation when showing 
pictures of snakes to their subjects. In our sample we notice an increase in SDNN/RMSSD 
ratio in periods 1 and 5 (Table 9, Figure 8) suggesting a peak of anxiety in subjects. 
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Regarding our results about the total power of all frequencies we cannot conclude as the high 
frequencies and the low frequencies are both involved in this variable. 
 
 
4.2. Power of anticipation 
 
Regarding mean heart rate and mean RR, we show that statistical differences exist between 
the baseline periods and the periods after drawing the results of the lottery. However, no such 
difference exists between the periods when the lottery is announced and the periods when the 
result is known. This result suggests that the power of the anticipation made by the subjects is 
as strong as the happiness felt by participants when learning the drawing. 
 
SDHR and SDNN peaks occurring in periods 1 and 5, during the first minute after the lottery 
announcement and after the drawing, follow the same pattern. We do not detect any 
differences between periods 1 and 5regarding SDNN or SDHR. The SDNN/RMSSD ratio 
exhibit the same pattern, without significant difference existing between periods 1 and 5. 
 
 
5. Limitations and extension to further research 
 
When using students in experiments, using bonus points is quite common (Biais et al. 2005 as 
an illustration). However, most of lottery experiment use cash payments to ensure participants 
commitment (Shiv et al. 2005) to balance the hazardous and boring sides of a lottery. 
Moreover, in experiments with market replications, participants do tasks, not in lottery 
experiments, especially in our case where students have to stay motionless during three 
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periods of four minutes to ensure good heart-beat measurement. Hence, using bonus-points 
may not be as affective rich as money and the measure taken not as accurate. 
 
The lottery itself could be demotivating a bit. In order to have equal parameters between the 
two lotteries except for Skewness our probability distribution is unusual. Subjects 
participating in lottery 2 with positive Skewness have only 1% of chance to win 4.25 bonus 
points and even if the experimenter assure them that the lottery is real and that points are 
added on their grade; they were nor very convinced. 
 
In addition, we were unable to use parametric tests because of the non-normality of our 
sample. Non-parametric tests are less powerful than parametric ones. To illustrate this, we 
consider the two treatment as independent for the mean heart rate variable (meanhr_period). 
Considering the two treatments separately, we find that for treatment 1 (lottery with 0 
Skewness), the Chi-square of the Friedman Test is 9.289 (p = .054) when we compare means 
of baseline and periods 1 to 4. This result suggests that the differences in means we observed 
considering the whole sample all come from treatment 2, meaning that in terms of heart rate, 
participants in treatment 1 do not form any beliefs, they just wait. Again if we compare 
baseline with periods 5 to 8 the Chi-square is 9.022 (p = .061), suggesting that participants in 
this treatment do not feel any sentiment regarding their payoffs. For treatment 2 we obtain a 
Chi-square of 22.280 (p = .000) confirming the prediction that all anticipations and all 
sentiments are made by participants in the second treatment. 
 
Finally, physiological measures like HRV are usually taken over longer periods of time 
(usually 24h or 5-minute intervals). Even if several studies have demonstrated the possibility 
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to take measures in shorter intervals (up to 10 seconds) research is not undivided and some 
measures like very low frequencies cannot be interpreted over short periods. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
We introduce physiological measures in the investigation of beliefs formation in the presence 
of lotteries. We use lotteries with the same characteristics except for Skewness and take heart 
rate and HRV during several periods of time to highlight the beliefs persistence over time. 
 
We show that participants in the lottery with 0 skewness exhibit greater emotion regulation 
one minute before learning the lottery result compared with subjects participating in the 
skewed lottery. Hence their biased anticipation is less persistent about the possible future 
payoffs. In regards with the self-regulation theory they seem to be more aware about the 
lottery they take part in.  
 
Considering the whole sample, we find evidence that subjects form positive anticipations the 
second minute after visualizing the lottery probabilities and that anticipation is stable until the 
results drawing in terms of mean heart rate and beat to beat interval.  
 
The happiness induced by “winning” follow a similar pattern starting from the second minute 
after visualizing the results but vanishes two minutes later, eliciting that this emotion is less 
persistent over time than the anticipations made. However, in terms of mean RR, the 
happiness starts earlier. Our results regarding standard deviation of heart rate, as well as 
standard deviation of beat to beat intervals and SDNN/RMSSD demonstrate a peak in the 
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anticipation felt by participant the minute after watching the lottery and a peak in the 
emotions felt the minute after learning the results. 
 
Finally, we study the power of the anticipations formed compared with the lottery drawing 
announcement. We do not find any differences between anticipations and happiness induced 
by the earnings in terms of mean heart rate, mean of beat to beat intervals, standard deviation 
of heart rate, standard deviation of beat to beat intervals nor SDNN/RMSSD ratio the 
anticipation seems to be less powerful. 
 
Overall, our experiment supports the existing literature in Finance on beliefs formation and 
anticipations. 
 
  
 159 
References 
 
 
Anon, 1996. Heart rate variability. Standards of measurement, physiological 
interpretation, and clinical use. Task Force of the European Society of Cardiology 
and the North American Society of Pacing and Electrophysiology. European heart 
journal, 17(3), pp.354–381. 
 
Bernat, E. et al., 2006. Effects of picture content and intensity on affective 
physiological response. Psychophysiology, 43(1), pp.93–103. 
 
Biais, B. et al., 2005. Judgemental Overconfidence, Self-Monitoring, and Trading 
Performance in an Experimental Financial Market. The Review of Economic 
Studies, 72(2), pp.287–312. 
 
Bradley, R.T., McCraty, R., Atkinson, M., Tomasino, D., Daugherty, A. & Arguelles, 
L., 2010a. Emotion Self-Regulation, Psychophysiological Coherence, and Test 
Anxiety: Results from an Experiment Using Electrophysiological Measures. 
Applied Psychophysiology and Biofeedback, 35(4), pp.261–283. 
 
Bradley, R.T., McCraty, R., Atkinson, M., Tomasino, D., Daugherty, A. & Arguelles, 
L., 2010b. Emotion Self-Regulation, Psychophysiological Coherence, and Test 
Anxiety: Results from an Experiment Using Electrophysiological Measures. 
Applied Psychophysiology and Biofeedback, 35(4), pp.261–283. 
 
Breznitz, S., 1971. A study of worrying. The British journal of social and clinical 
psychology, 10(3), pp.271–279. 
 
Brunnermeier, M.K. & Parker, J.A., 2005. Optimal Expectations. The American 
Economic Review, 95(4), pp.1092–1118. 
 
Brunnermeier, M.K. et al., 2008. An economic model of the planning fallacy, 
 
Christie, I.C. & Friedman, B.H., 2004a. Autonomic specificity of discrete emotion and 
dimensions of affective space: a multivariate approach. International Journal of 
Psychophysiology, 51(2), pp.143–153. 
 
 
 160 
Christie, I.C. & Friedman, B.H., 2004b. Autonomic specificity of discrete emotion and 
dimensions of affective space: a multivariate approach. International Journal of 
Psychophysiology, 51(2), pp.143–153. 
 
Codispoti, M., Surcinelli, P. & Baldaro, B., 2008. Watching emotional movies: 
Affective reactions and gender differences. International Journal of 
Psychophysiology, 69(2), pp.90–95. 
 
Diest, I. et al., 2001. Hyperventilation beyond fight/flight: Respiratory responses 
during emotional imagery. Psychophysiology, 38(6), pp.961–968. 
 
DIMBERG, U. & THUNBERG, M., 2007. Speech anxiety and rapid emotional 
reactions to angry and happy facial expressions. Scandinavian Journal of 
Psychology, 48(4), pp.321–328. 
 
Geisler, F.C.M., Vennewald, N., Kubiak, T. & Weber, H., 2010. The impact of heart 
rate variability on subjective well-being is mediated by emotion regulation. 
Personality and Individual Differences, 49(7), pp.723–728. 
 
Gross, J.J., 2002. Emotion regulation: affective, cognitive, and social consequences. 
Psychophysiology, 39(3), pp.281–291. 
 
Kornreich, C. et al., 1998. Alcoholism and emotional reactivity: more heterogeneous 
film-induced emotional response in newly detoxified alcoholics compared to 
controls--a preliminary study. Addictive behaviors, 23(3), pp.413–418. 
 
Kreibig, S.D., 2010. Autonomic nervous system activity in emotion: A review. 
Biological Psychology, 84(3), pp.394–421. 
 
Loewenstein, G., 1987. Anticipation and the Valuation of Delayed Consumption. The 
Economic Journal, 97(387), pp.666–684. 
 
Markus K Brunnermeier, C.G.J.A.P., 2007. Optimal Beliefs, Asset Prices, and the 
Preference for Skewed Returns. pp.1–34. 
 
Mayraz, G., 2013. The optimism bias: experiment and model. pp.1–37. 
 
 
 161 
McCraty, R. et al., 1998. The impact of a new emotional self-management program 
on stress, emotions, heart rate variability, DHEA and cortisol. Integrative 
physiological and behavioral science : the official journal of the Pavlovian Society, 
33(2), pp.151–170. 
 
Monat, A., Averill, J.R. & Lazarus, R.S., 1972. Anticipatory stress and coping 
reactions under various conditions of uncertainty. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 24(2), pp.237–253. 
 
Murakami, H. et al., 2009. Influence of attention to somatic information on emotional 
and autonomic responses. Perceptual and motor skills, 108(2), pp.531–539. 
 
NUSSINOVITCH, U. et al., 2011. The efficiency of 10-second resting heart rate for 
the evaluation of short-term heart rate variability indices. Pacing and clinical 
electrophysiology : PACE, 34(11), pp.1498–1502. 
 
Oster, E., Shoulson, I. & Dorsey, E.R., 2011. Optimal Expectations and Limited 
Medical Testing: Evidence from Huntington Disease. 
 
Rottenstreich, Y. & Hsee, C.K., 2001. Money, Kisses, and Electric Shocks: On the 
Affective Psychology of Risk. Psychological Science, 12(3), pp.185–190. 
 
Shepperd, J.A., 2005. Anxiety and Outcome Predictions. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 31(2), pp.267–275. 
 
Shiv, B. et al., 2005. Investment behavior and the negative side of emotion. 
Psychological Science, 16(6), pp.435–439. 
 
Sieff, E.M., Dawes, R.M. & Loewenstein, G., 1999. Anticipated versus actual reaction 
to HIV test results. The American journal of  …. 
 
  
 162 
Appendix 
 
 
 
 
Last name: 
First name: 
Gender: 
Age: 
 
 
Lottery game: rules of the game 
 
 
You are going to participate in a lottery game in which you will have the opportunity to win 
bonus points for Professor Laurent Germain courses. This game is real and the bonus points 
you will earn will be recorded by your professor.  
 
Please follow these instructions carefully so that the experience occurs in the best conditions. 
 
You will participate in one of the following lotteries. The experimenter will draw in which 
lottery you will participate. 
 
Lottery 1: 
• 1% of chance to win 1,5 bonus points (1) 
• 49% of chance to win 1,5 bonus points (2) 
• 50% of chance to win 0,5 bonus points (3) 
 
Lottery 2: 
• 1% to win 4,25 bonus points (1) 
• 49% to win 1,35 bonus points (2) 
• 50% to win 0,59 bonus points (3) 
 
 
The experiment will occur as follows: 
 
1. With you consent, the experimenter will explain you how to place properly the 
electrodes to measure your heartbeat in order to guarantee a reliable measure. Then, 
you will be asked to fill in questionnaires 1, 2 and 3 without thinking too long about 
the answers you will wish to circle (we are interested in your instinctive impressions). 
 
2. Once these questionnaires filled in, the experimenter will inform you that he will start 
taking your heartbeat measure continuously until the end of the experiment. You will 
have to wait for 4 minutes without making sudden movements (like shaking etc.). 
During this period of time the experimenter will tell you the time remaining, 3 
minutes, 2 minutes, 1 minute 30, 30 seconds. 
 
3. At the end of this period the experimenter will draw the lottery in which you will 
participate in (lottery 1 or lottery 2). To do so, he will show a sheet of paper with the 
For the experimenter only 
 
Subject number: 
Treatment number: 
Earnings: 
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lottery number and the possible payoffs of that lottery. Next, you will have to wait 
for 4 minutes without making sudden movements (like shaking etc.). During this 
period of time the experimenter will tell you the time remaining, 3 minutes, 2 minutes, 
1 minute 30, 30 seconds. 
 
4. Just after this period, the experimenter will draw from a transparent box containing 
100 papers (1 paper representing the 1% probability, 49 papers for the 49% probability 
and 50 papers for the 50% probability) the result of the lottery and will inform you of 
your earnings (verbally and by showing you the paper). The experimenter cannot see 
what is written on the pieces of papers and shake the bowl before the draw. 
 
§ If the number on the paper is 1, thus your earnings are 1,5 points or 4,25 points 
depending on the lottery you play.  
§ If the number on the paper is 2, thus your earnings are 1,5 points or 1,35 points 
depending on the lottery you play.  
§ If the number on the paper is 3 thus your earnings are 0,5 points or 0,59 points 
depending on the lottery you play.  
 
5. Next, you will have to wait for 4 minutes without making sudden movements (like 
shaking etc.). During this period of time the experimenter will tell you the time 
remaining, 3 minutes, 2 minutes, 1 minute 30, 30 seconds. 
 
At the end of this period the experimenter will ask you to remove electrodes and he 
will conduct a debriefing with you.   
 
 
If you have any questions about the procedure, please ask them right now. 
 
 
 
 
4	min 4	min 4	min
Start	of	
measurement
Drawof	
the	lottery
Lottery
results
E
N
D
 164 
General conclusion 
 
As have been underlined throughout this thesis, mainly in the first chapter, many of the 
investors investment mistakes and failures in diversification can be explained with 
behavioural biases and investors preferences. Several empirical findings support the idea that 
overall they perform worse than the market. We have shown that Neurosciences may be 
particularly useful to investigate the brain connections underlying such behaviours. 
 
In chapter 2, we investigate the impacts of the 2008-2011 financial crises on individual 
investors returns and their expectations towards their financial intermediaries in four different 
countries (Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg) and two different types of banks 
customers (high net worth individuals and retail customers). We show that wealthier investors 
remain less risk averse than the others and adopt less conservative strategies. We also 
highlight the news expectations both types have towards their financial intermediaries that is 
more transparency and better client services.  
 
In chapter 3, we propose a physiological test of the Brunnermeier and Parker model (2005). 
To extent we use a two identical lotteries experiment except for their skewness. We find that 
all participants form anticipatory emotions once they know the lottery they will play. These 
emotions start from the second minute of the waiting interval and remain stable until they 
learn their payoffs.  We also show that the emotions felt by subjects once learned their 
payoffs are as strong as the anticipatory emotions they formed earlier. Finally, we 
demonstrate that participants to the skewed lottery are less self-regulated than others, 
highlighting their preference for skewness. Their emotions are stronger and more persistent. 
